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Purpose:  The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding for if, and how, different views 
on efficiency and effectiveness characterized the organisation of the eye clinic in the SUS hospital 
merger. What presumptions operative efficiencies affected hospital management’s merger decision? 
What were the expected benefits and what kind of organisational structure would help to achieve 
these? Finally, did different views on efficiencies affect how groups of individuals believe that the 
transformation should be carried out? In order to satisfy this purpose, we formulated three 
constituent objectives for research: 
 
(1) How do doctors and managers believe efficiency is and/or should be measured? 
(2) What do they think is efficient in an organisational change process, such as the SUS hospital 
merger? 
(3) What do they believe is efficient in a doctor’s daily work?  
 
Methodology: This is a qualitative study where we have adopted an abductive study approach, with 
an interpretivist/constructivist positioning. Thus we have not tried to identify the absolute truth. 
Instead we have tried to identify, evaluate and describe the different individuals’ views and 
perspectives on various aspects.  
 
Theoretical perspectives:  The theoretical perspectives cover professions and professional 
bureaucracies, the definitions of effectiveness, efficiency and related concepts, optimal hospital size, 
quality of care, organisational change and management and merger theory.  
 
Empirical foundation: We conducted interviews with six managers from different levels of the 
vertical hierarchy of the SUS hospital, and eight clinical doctors with different backgrounds and 
current responsibilities, all working at the Eye clinic. We created and followed a semi-structured 
interview guide that we used to interview both managers and doctors. During the interviews we 
focused on open-ended questions that would bring the interviewees to freely express their views on 
the subject. 
  
Conclusions: In response to our research objectives we can conclude that; there is little agreement as 
to how measurements in healthcare in general, and the SUS hospital in particular, should be defined; 
there are different views on how to manage organisational change between managers and doctors, 
where management prefer a top-down approach while doctors believe that they should have more 
say in how the change is carried out; doctor’s stress the need for customized IT-support, stricter job 
specialisation, clear patient processes and the possibility to form informal networks and knowledge 
clusters. It appears that management has a narrow view of what doctor’s feel is necessary for 
improving efficiency in their daily work since many of these efficiencies have been impaired as a 
result of the top-down managed merger.  
 
In sum, it seems that our initial impression, that different views on efficiencies may cause problems 
in change processes, still poses a viable correlation between these aspects. 
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List of terms and abbreviations 
 
UMAS – University Hospital of Malmö 
USIL – University Hospital of Lund 
SUS – Skåne University Hospital 
PROLUMA – Process preceding SUS merger. An initiative to investigate the operations of 
highly specialized care at the hospitals in Lund and Malmö in order to merge some functions, 
encourage cooperation between units and profile the hospitals’ production of highly 
specialised health care.  
Kömiljarden – Health care bonus in place in Sweden granting additional funds to 
hospitals/units managing to shorten or eliminate patient queues.  
Vårdgarantin – Health care guarantee set in place in Sweden to make sure all patient 
referrals are attended within three months. 
PASiS – IT-system, primary patient- and OP- planning system, used by nurses 
Melior – IT-system, primary patient journal handling by doctors and nurses 
ATD – Consultancy firm hired by Region Skåne to advise on efficiency development 
McKinsey – Consultancy firm hired by Region Skåne to advise on merger process 
preparations 
DRG – Diagnostics Related Groups, weighted values of resources required for treatment of 
patients. Used for determining financing and measuring in the health care system.  
ICU – Intensive care unit of a hospital 
Cataract – Malady of the eye related to ageing, clouding of the crystalline lens causing less 
light to enter the eye.  
Glaucoma – Malady of the eye where the optic nerve suffers damage. It may cause bleeding 
in the eye and is related to diabetes patients.  
 
  
4 
 
I – Background 
 
1.1 History 
1.1.1 Healthcare management 
Healthcare in Sweden, and other countries in Europe, has been in a state of significant change for the 
past few decades (Choi, 2011; Ahgren, 2008; Olafsson, 2008). Rising costs of care require more and 
more attention, both due to a real price increase on the supply side and an ageing population on the 
demand side (OECD, 2003). Consequently hospitals seek to further improve their efficiency and 
effectiveness. The technical and medical development of what is possible to provide has also 
increased. However, society’s access to resources increases relatively less than the demand for 
health care and its technical development. Hence, there exists a gap between what is medically and 
technologically possible, a gap that is likely to grow (Hallin & Siverbo, 2003; Elmqvist, 2002).  
 
In Sweden, Europe and North America hospital mergers have become increasingly common and it is a 
universally accepted norm among policy makers for increasing efficiency, reducing costs and 
improving quality of care. Despite this the outcomes of hospital mergers have not been 
systematically evaluated (Weil, 2010; Ahgren, 2008; Aiken & Sloane, 2002). Another concern is to 
concentrate specialities in order to offset the loss of competent personnel due to massive 
retirements in the years to come (Arbetsförmedlingen, 2010; Region Skåne, 2009g). Due to the 
financial impact of healthcare in Sweden, this public professional service has attracted much 
attention from media and politics. Recent mergers include the 1997 merger of Mölndal, Östra 
Sjukhuset and Sahlgrenska in Gothenburg (Sahlgrenska.se) and the merger of Huddinge and 
Karolinska in Stockholm in 2004 (karolinska.se). However, the most recent one is the merger of the 
university hospitals in Lund (USiL) and Malmö (UMAS), to form Skåne University Hospital (SUS), 
effectuated in January 2010 (Region Skåne, 2011). These three compose the biggest trio of hospitals 
in Sweden. While the notions of economies of scale, efficiency and “Lean” operations has gained 
support and followers, critics question the applicability of these in a public professional service 
setting. The reason being that most models have been developed based on private sector 
manufacturing settings (Bringselius, 2008). Furthermore, the existing models on optimal hospital size 
seem to indicate that the current size of SUS is much too large (Posnett, 2002). Recent studies of the 
previous mergers in Sweden also reveal that the expected benefits are not realised and that hospital 
mergers are not always appropriate (Choi, 2011; Olafsson, 2008).  
 
1.1.2 Lund and Malmö Hospitals 
The history of the University Hospital in Lund, USiL (Universitetssjukhuset i Lund) begins in 1768 as 
one of Sweden’s first hospitals and it was confirmed as a university hospital in 1993 (Region Skåne, 
2011). Before the fusion the hospital had a work force of 7 700 and 980 permanent patient beds. The 
budget for 2006 was 5.4 billion Swedish crowns (SEK) (Region Skåne, 2007). The University Hospital in 
Malmö, UMAS (Universitetssjukhuset MAS, Malmös Allmänna Sjukhus) was founded in 1896 and 
redefined as a University hospital in 1994 (Region Skåne, 2011). Together with UMAS almost 5 000 
employees, almost 840 patient beds, and a budget of 4.7 billion SEK in, as of 2007, (Region Skåne, 
2009f) the merged SUS encompasses 12 500 employees, 1 750 permanent patient beds and 10 billion 
SEK in budget 2010-2011(Region Skåne, 2011). The combined hospital SUS will provide care to an 
area encompassing 1.7 million citizens (Region Skåne, 2011).  
 
1.1.3 The Merger Process  
Work with the merger started officially in 2008 with the decision to engage in a profiling exercise 
(PROLUMA) to determine areas of potential benefits from merging parts of, or whole, units of the 
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two hospitals (skane.se/proluma). A preliminary round of merging certain clinics started in 2008, with 
the mission to merge highly specialized care clinics’ inpatient ward units and on-call duty. At the end 
of 2009 a decision was taken to merge the two hospitals, which was officially implemented on 
January 1st 2010. Reasons for the merger, similar to those claimed in previous mergers, were to 
utilize the collective resources of the two hospitals in matters of healthcare, education and research, 
in the best possible way for patients today and in the future and, thus, improve competitiveness on a 
national and international market. Secondary goals include improving the attractiveness of 
employment at the hospital, create further opportunities for clinical research and achieve critical 
volumes for clinical operations and competence- and research development (Region Skåne, 2010b). 
 
The merger has featured in media frequently the last year (e.g. Skanskan.se; Sydsvenskan.se), 
especially pertaining to employees' loss of sense of job security, confidence in the organisation's 
leadership and a resulting loss of employees. The merger was also opposed in the Swedish 
administrative court (Förvaltningsrätten) on grounds of not being announced in the correct way, 
impairing the formation of public opinion and the political process (Sydsvenskan, 2010). In particular 
the Eye clinic has been singled out as having encountered several problems in the merger process. 
These include personnel resistance, loss of competence, lengthening patient queues and reduced 
productivity, especially with corneal- and cataract surgery where some patients have been sent to 
other hospitals for treatment (Skånska dagbladet, 2011b). The decision to concentrate several units 
of the clinic to Malmö, such as retinal surgery, was met with particular resistance among personnel.  
 
  
SUS merger (1/1 - 2010)
SUS merger announcedProluma announced
Clinics merger (Proluma)
SUS overruled
We begin our study
We end our study
Timeline of Proluma and SUS events
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1.2 The complexity of a hospital merger 
In 2008 the PROLUMA project was announced by Region Skåne in southern Sweden. It contained 
plans for merging 14 pairs of clinics belonging to the Lund and Malmö university hospitals. Some of 
the clinics protested against the way in which the clinics were supposed to be merged and how the 
management and the highly specialized care would be concentrated to one of the hospitals in each 
pair of merging clinics. The most cited clinic in the Swedish newspapers was the eye clinic in Lund 
where the doctors did not agree that management and large parts of the operations should be 
concentrated to Malmö. After the clinic-merger announcement there has been a significant loss of 
competence due to voluntary resignations. 
 
As a response to the recent developments within public healthcare, with rising costs of care without 
a real possibility for increased funding, hospitals must develop their operations to work more 
effectively and efficiently. However, hospitals are very complex organisations directed by three main 
groups of actors: doctors, administrators and politicians. These are influenced by their respective 
backgrounds and positions and their ideas about how to best manage health care organisations are 
not always coinciding with each other (L. Axelsson, 2000; Hallin & Siverbo, 2003; Elmqvist, 2002). In 
response to this, L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström (2000) assert that: 
 
“The basis for successful development of the organization’s activities is probably a 
unanimous interpretation of the concept of effectiveness. It may then be expected that 
different decision levels will work in the same direction. Since business development is 
partly the relationship between objective and results, it is important to develop relevant 
measures in order to determine if goal fulfilment has been achieved.”(p.9) 
 
Health care authors have called for an increased research on hospital mergers (Choi, 2011) and argue 
that most mergers fall short due to managers lacking the necessary understanding and appreciation 
of the differences in culture, values and goals of the existing organisation (Weil, 2010). There is a 
need for increased effectiveness and efficiency, and room for improvement is big within several 
areas such as the operational business, prioritisations and output control (Elmqvist, 2002; Hallin & 
Siverbo, 2003). After studying a major Swedish hospital merger in Stockholm, Choi draws the 
conclusion that: 
 
“A true understanding of the intra- and inter dynamics inherent in a context with 
multiple layers of competing institutional logics, such as public sector health care, seems 
essential to produce functional organizational outcomes.” Choi (20111) 
 
Hence our ambition with this study is to try and contribute with one part of the puzzle to the 
understanding of the efficient and effective health care organising and change management. 
 
Our study is based on a belief that critical areas are important to understand, both in order to be 
better at handling the problems that occur and to minimize their negative effects. Employee 
discontent, possibly increased by intense media attention, may spread to the rest of the change 
process in other parts of the organisation (Morris, 2008). Resignations can also have a demoralizing 
effect on the employees (Staw, 1980). Thus an understanding of possible critical areas is important to 
be able to prepare and evaluate different aspects of the merger. Hence, our study has focused on the 
clinic with the most negative media attention and apparent complications; the eye clinic. 
                                                          
1
 This exact quotation is found in the discussion of Choi’s abstract which is not paginated. It involves two 
aspects that she combines in the discussion. These can be found separately on page 45 and 54.  
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II - Purpose and objectives  
2.1 Purpose  
The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding for if, and how, different views on 
efficiency and effectiveness characterized the organisation of the eye clinic in the SUS hospital 
merger. We wondered what basic presumptions about operative efficiencies affected the hospital 
management’s decision on whether to merge the two clinics or not. What were the envisaged 
benefits and what kind of organisational structure would help the clinic and hospital to achieve 
these? Finally, did different views on efficiencies affect how groups of individuals believe that the 
transformation should be carried out in order to ensure that the end results are truly effective? 
Following the reasoning mentioned above, our study focused on the investigation of these views in 
the eye clinic, where most problems have appeared.   
 
The graphic below illustrates our idea of how these views on efficiencies might interrelate and affect 
the decision regarding if a merger is necessary, what the change should consist of, and how to realize 
the merger of two clinics. In the end we think that differing views on efficiencies might have an effect 
on the performance, cost structure and quality of care provided by clinics; and consequently an 
effect on the outcomes of hospitals and health care in general. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Objectives  
In order to address the purpose of this study we tried to identify possible disparities between 
doctors’ and managers’ views on operational, organisational and management efficiencies. The 
operational efficiencies correspond to whether there is a need for change. The organisational 
efficiencies correspond to what needs to be changed and what the result should be. The 
management efficiencies correspond to how a change should be carried out in the best possible way. 
During the course of our study these three research questions were formulated: 
 
(1) How do doctors and managers believe efficiency is and/or should be measured? 
(2) What do they think is efficient in an organisational change process, such as a hospital merger? 
(3) What do they believe is efficient in a doctor’s daily work?  
 
To answer these questions our study aimed at trying to identify the doctors’ and managers’ views on 
operational efficiency, the strategic and decision-making process, and what they believed were the 
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purpose and results of the merger. The interest for studying this is that if there are different views on 
efficiency and how to manage healthcare, any organisational change adopted will meet resistance. 
So, an understanding of such differences would allow managers to adapt plans accordingly. In the 
end, this would allow for more effective adaptations in modern healthcare which could increase 
overall quality and effectiveness of healthcare.  
 
2.3 Demarcation & focus 
There are some important aspects of this study that we need to delineate. We have to inform our 
reader that there are two processes that we will discuss. First, there is the PROLUMA process which 
is a county project where certain highly specialised clinics from two hospitals are merged. The second 
process is the SUS merger of the two entire hospitals which started almost two years after 
PROLUMA. For the sake of discussion we will often refer to these two processes as one process. This 
is because the doctors at the clinical level consider PROLUMA to be a merger. Thus, for them the SUS 
merger did not bring about too many new elements into the course of action. During our interviews 
we talked about “the merger” in general and neither we nor the doctors made any real distinction 
between the two processes. From the managers’ side the distinction was a little clearer, but we still 
talked about the merger in general during the interviews. Concerning the top managers it is also 
important to note that their perspectives are mainly encompassing the entire hospital while the 
doctors’ perspectives embrace the clinic. 
 
Furthermore we are only studying two of the three major actors within health care: doctors and 
managers (administrators). We will not study the political aspects of health care management and 
the politicians’ views on efficiency in health care, since we believe that merits an entire study 
conducted separately.  
 
The reason why we chose to study only doctors instead of including other hospital personnel such as 
nurses is mainly because of the characteristics of the profession. The doctors are commonly depicted 
as one of three archetypes, and sometimes even the archetype, of professions (Alvesson, 2004; 
Freidson, 1994) while nurses are described as semi-professionals (Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). We will 
discuss professions further in our theory review chapter. The health care literature that we have read 
is mainly focusing on the doctors, who are ascribed a status as the key workers in health care 
(Freidson, 1975). In their role they are highly autonomous and they both define and develop the 
health care practices (Mintzberg, 1993). This, together with being the actual superiors of the nurses, 
distinguishes them from the nurses.  
 
If we studied both doctors and nurses we believe there is a possibility that these two groups have 
different views on efficiency and that the scope of our study would be greatly broadened.  We 
believe that a study on possible differences between nurses’ and doctors’ views on efficiency could 
bring about interesting results as well, but that is something we leave to others to delve into. 
 
A final note is that we will not actively try to evaluate whether the decision to merge the clinics and 
hospitals was correct or not. This is because the causality between merger and outcomes might be 
difficult to determine over time.  Also, results of the merger may be even more difficult to determine 
so soon after it was carried out. However, as we are studying the perspectives of the managers and 
doctors their ideas and opinions on the merger will be reflected in the study.  
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III - Methodology  
3.1 The abduction approach 
In qualitative research, where the focus is on how the individual perceives the surrounding reality, 
the study approach is mainly inductive (Backman, 2008). We have kept an open mind to the possible 
existence of several different theoretical aspects and have thus rather tried to identify if there are 
any ideas or arguments brought up in our research that can be referred to any of these. Our study 
was not based on any particular theoretical framework. However, as we had some broad theories in 
mind that we expected to be useful, and elements of which we were aware of could emerge in our 
study, our research contains a modicum of deduction, which is rather common in the inductive 
process (Bryman & Bell, 2007). It is usually referred to as abduction when moving back and forth 
between an inductive and deductive approach (Björklund & Paulsson, 2003). Abduction is probably 
the method used in real practice in many case-studies (Alvesson & Sködberg, 2009), and also in ours. 
It should not be seen as a mix of induction and deduction. Instead the empirical area is successfully 
developed and then the broader proposed pattern of theory is adjusted and refined during the 
research process. Compared to the other two approaches it includes understanding as well and is 
rather close to hermeneutics (Ibid.).  
 
3.2 Epistemological and ontological positions 
Our epistemological view is interpretivism, or more precisely: hermeneutic-phenomenology. Bryman 
and Bell (2007) describes interpretivism as the view where people and institutions are seen as 
fundamentally different from natural sciences in the way that the same scientific models cannot be 
applied to study the subject. Instead of a positivist view, where an explanation of human behaviour is 
attempted, the theories and methods used in the interpretative view are concerned with interpreting 
and understanding human behaviour. What is emphasized in phenomenology is that the human 
behaviour is to be seen as a product of how people interpret the world and therefore attempts are 
made to see things from the individual person’s point of view (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). The 
philosophy of phenomenology is concerned with how the individuals make sense of the world 
around them and the social scientist is thus supposed “to gain access to people’s ‘common-sense 
thinking’” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.17). The scientific value of individuals’ common sense is neatly 
captured by the Nobel economics prize laureate Gunnar Myrdal (1969) asserting that “science is 
nothing but highly sophisticated common sense” (p.14).  
 
Our ontological position is one of social constructivism. This approach is not particularly theory-
oriented; instead the revelation of how social phenomena are socially constructed is at focus 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). These phenomena are regarded as continually being produced and 
reproduced by social actors, through social interaction, and thus are constantly revised (Bryman & 
Bell, 2007). This ontological position could also be labelled “the qualitative perspective” wherein it is 
argued that reality is an individual, social and cultural construction (Backman, 2008).  
 
In our study we have not tried to identify the absolute truth and we have not tried to evaluate the 
merger in order to determine whether it was appropriate or not. Nor have we tried to describe the 
cause and effects of actions or inactions. Instead we have tried to identify, evaluate and describe the 
different individuals’ views and perspectives on various aspects. Thus we have tried to interpret how 
the events in the SUS merger are products of individuals’ sense-making of the world around them 
and how they believe this reality is approached in the best way, for example through different 
organisational changes. We have also tried to identify discrepancies between groups of individuals 
belonging to vertically separated organisational positions in order to see if there are different social 
constructions that affect their perspectives. These positions are in our study limited to top managers, 
middle managers and doctors. 
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3.3 Procedure 
In order to satisfy the objective of this study, with our interpretative and social constructivist 
approach, it is essential that we collect our own primary data. Secondary data will be used only in 
order to describe the course of events, to complement with background details when necessary, and 
in order to build our arguments. We conducted interviews with six managers from different levels of 
the vertical hierarchy. Three of them had medical backgrounds while two of them had been working 
several years within the health care and pharmaceutical industry but without medical education. 
Among the eye clinic doctors we interviewed eight individuals with different backgrounds and 
current responsibilities. This is discussed further below.  
 
The managers were asked about their views on organisational efficiency as well as what they think is 
efficient in a doctor’s daily work. They were also asked “how do you believe that doctor’s perceive 
efficiency?” The aim with this last question was to see if the managers believe they have differing 
views due to their different organisational positions and professional status. It would potentially give 
us an indication as to whether they believe perspectives on efficiency can differ depending on 
different socially constructed realities adhering to various organisational positions. Correspondingly, 
we posed the same questions to the doctors to see what they thought was efficient in their own daily 
work and if they believed that the management had the same ideas. 
 
All interviews were scheduled for an hour. However, the actual interviews ranged between 51 
minutes and 134 minutes, with an average 78 minutes. Before the interview we briefly presented 
ourselves, our educational program and the purpose of the study. We also explained that we were 
not out to judge the merger in terms of being successful or not, but rather that we believed the 
context of the merger would shed light on the differing views on efficiency. We asked for permission 
to record the interview and informed our interviewees that their identities would be held 
anonymous and that they would have access to any material used from the interview before 
publication. During the interview we focused on open-ended questions that would bring the 
interviewees to freely express their views on the subject.  We were extra cautious about not 
mentioning any kinds of key words, or value laden words. Instead we hoped that these would be 
brought up by the interviewee so that any of our follow-up questions used wordings previously 
brought up by the interviewee.  However, in some cases we felt the need to use a certain term when 
clarification was needed.  
 
We created and followed a semi-structured interview guide (enclosed in Appendix I) that we used to 
interview both managers and doctors. In some cases our questions were rendered obsolete during 
the course of the discussion, while some answers merited further and probing and questioning. 
Furthermore, as we proceeded with our interviews new questions arose. Thus, some questions were 
added during the course of the study, based on previous interviews. When interviewing the 
managers the additional questions were quite similar to those on our initial guide. When 
interviewing the doctors we added some questions based on the discussions with the managers and 
these have been accounted for below the headline “Additional questions to the doctors” in the same 
appendix (Appendix I). 
 
The interviews were conducted in Swedish and the extracts we have used in our paper were 
translated into English by ourselves with careful consideration to the reproduction of the same sense 
and context as expressed by our interviewees. Hence, we have tried to convey their point of view as 
realistically as possible, rather than focus on language correctness. Consequently, some quotes may 
contain certain grammatical irregularities and manners of speech, expressions and, to some extent, 
‘Swenglish’ adaptations. In the same way we have translated the citations from secondary material 
ourselves as many of these have been in Swedish. 
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3.4 Primary data collection 
3.4.1 Choice of clinic 
Our interest for this study emerged when we heard about the merger between the Lund and Malmö 
university hospitals. We decided to focus on one clinic in order to limit our scope and the choice of 
studying the eye clinic came naturally for several reasons. It was not the only clinic that had severe 
problems, but it was the one that was most frequently discussed in newspapers, on the internet and 
by those we heard talking about the merger. We considered this to be good characteristics of a field 
study as the effects, disparities and other events would be more salient and thus easier to observe. It 
was also the clinic that we, through a contact’s contact, could get access to a first informal 
conversation that helped us understand some of the major events and establish our research 
questions.  
 
In addition to these reasons we believe that the most critical areas within a change process deserves 
extra attention. Our hopes are thus that our study can contribute to a better understanding of this 
case in particular that might be useful both in its future process but also for other similar envisaged 
processes. We believe that identifying where not to push the change through so forcefully, or 
assigning these critical areas extra resources, might be ways in which processes dependent on 
organisational-specific contingencies can increase their chances of success. In the selection of 
individuals we have chosen to delimit ourselves to a group of managers on the one hand, and a 
group of doctors working at the eye clinic on the other.  
 
3.4.2 Selection of individuals: managers 
We conducted our interviews during the spring of 2011 and we started off by contacting and 
interviewing the management. We contacted strategically chosen managers either with a direct 
connection to the eye clinic, or with a good insight in and/or responsibility for the hospitals and the 
Proluma and SUS merger processes. Out of nine people contacted two referred us to another person, 
two did not answer and six accepted to be interviewed. We have divided the managers into two 
groups: top managers and middle managers. One of the managers interviewed was the Region 
Director who is referred to as either the Region Director or a top manager depending on the 
importance of pointing out his special role in the merger process as the premier initiator.  
 
3.4.3 Selection of individuals: doctors 
We contacted the doctors in two different ways. First, from an initial contact at the eye clinic we 
received a list of names of current and previously employed doctors at both Malmö and Lund. From 
this list we chose a number of individuals to contact based on the prerequisite that they had worked 
from before the PROLUMA process until after the SUS merger commenced. Secondly there was a 
manager who gave us the contact information to a number of doctors from both Malmö and Lund 
that we contacted. Thus we have tried to reach a good mix of doctors from both sites and through 
different contacts. In total we interviewed eight eye clinic doctors. Something we saw as a possible 
problem was that we would risk talking to individuals within one or two specific group of friends or 
close colleagues who in a way have become homogenized through discussions at lunch etc. This 
could, for example, lead to ideas or the use of words of one colleague having spread to the other 
colleagues. On the other hand, this is a reality of any workplace consisting of a group of like-minded 
individuals.  
 
3.5 Secondary sources 
The secondary sources used are mainly documents from the SUS web page (www.skane.se/sus) and 
the documented information on the Proluma web page (skane.se/proluma). This involves mail 
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correspondence, mission statements and reports. In the cases where documents were accessed in 
Swedish relevant excerpts have been translated to English in text.  
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IV - Literature review 
4.1 Hospital size – bigger is better? 
There is a common conviction among Swedish policy makers that bigger hospitals lead to lower 
average costs and an improved clinical outcome even if the effects of hospital mergers have not been 
systematically evaluated (Ahgren, 2008). Between the years 1980 and 2008 the emergency care 
hospitals with consistent and coherent management have decreased from 118 to 54, partly due to 
mergers (Ibid.). The optimal hospital size is dependent on patient accessibility, specialised care that 
requires a certain volume to ensure positive patient outcomes, and possible economies of scale 
(Posnett, 2002). Lowering average costs by increasing hospital size presumes that the organisation 
can profit from economies of scale which is a situation in which large-volume operations result in 
lower unit costs (Thompson, Strickland & Gamble, 2007). It can allow some firms to gain competitive 
cost advantages over others and is most likely to occur in capital-intensive industries such as 
factories and assembly line production. In contrast, it is less likely to occur in labour intensive 
industries, although there are examples of it (Besanko et al., 2010). However, for different reasons 
these economies of scale are not unlimited. Beyond a certain size bigger is no longer better and 
diseconomies of scale may arise, where the unit cost increases again and might even exceed its initial 
level (Morris et al., 2007; Besanko et al., 2010).  
 
After an extensive summary of a large number of studies Posnett (2002) found “remarkably 
consistent” (p. 103) results indicating that diseconomies of scale existed below 300 beds and above 
600 beds. The studies gave inconsistent indications as to what the actual optimal size would be, but 
they suggested it to be within this range. Harris, Ozgen & Ozcan (2000) found that mergers do affect 
hospitals’ scale efficiency but that they do not affect their technical efficiency (defined as the relation 
between input and output). However, the findings were not statistically significant and the hospitals 
were summed together and compared to each other in total number of beds. The average number of 
beds per merged hospital was 399 pre-merger and 378 post-merger. This means that the average 
number of hospital beds in their study was 200 or less since some mergers consisted of more than 
two hospitals. The Lund and Malmö hospitals used to have 980 and 840 respectively (equals 1820 
pre-merger) while today the post-merger number of beds is 1 750 (Region Skåne, 2011). Studies on 
the economy of scale of hospitals in this category of size seem to be rare. Hospital employees in 
other Swedish hospital mergers have been found not to believe in any quality improvement or 
generated economies of scale (Rosengren et al., 1999; Ahgren, 2008; Olafsson, 2008). 
 
Another concept that indicates favourable competitive advantages through size is the learning curve, 
where cost advantages are achieved through accumulated experience and know-how. This implies 
that if learning possibilities exists and the output is increased then unit costs will increase in the short 
run but eventually decrease in the long run as the organisation accumulates more knowledge about 
the production. This is mostly studied in relation to costs but it can be applied to quality of care as 
well where a doctor treating a higher number of patients accumulate more experience (Besanko et 
al., 2010).  
 
Boston Consulting Group has preached aggressive growth in order to exploit these learning 
advantages (Besanko et al., 2010). However, the underlying principles should not be forgotten since 
these unit cost reductions to a large extent are dependent on the organisational learning that has 
taken place during the time the output volume was increased. Thus, these benefits are primarily 
achieved through organic growth and not when the production is increased through mergers (Alarik, 
1982). Another underlying principle is that this experience is accumulated in the beginning of the 
product life cycle and that the “learning curve slope” eventually flattens out (Besanko et al., 2010). In 
correspondence to health care one could say that, for an inexperienced doctor the increase in output 
will lead to an increase in unit cost in the short run but lower unit costs in the long run. For an 
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experienced doctor, however, the short run unit costs will increase in the same way but the same 
advantages will not be achieved in the long term. Managers who cannot separate the benefits from 
economies of scale and the learning curve may draw the wrong conclusions regarding organisational 
size. If the low unit costs are a result of the learning curve an increase in size might not be favourable 
and vice versa (Besanko et al., 2010).  
 
Although the appeal of ‘bigger is better’ in hospital mergers is powerful, the empirical evidence is 
clearly weak for positive outcomes while significant for negative outcomes (Canadian Health Services 
Research Foundation, 2004). Despite theoretical economies of scale almost all studies (principally in 
Canada, Norway, Sweden and the UK)suggest that hospital consolidations raise costs of care by at 
least 2 %, while in the US this number is sometimes significantly higher (Weil, 2010). According to 
Alarik (1982) there are several possible explanations to why economies of scale fail to occur in 
horizontal fusions. One of those is that the basic business idea is incomplete and not easily replaced 
solely by a change in size. Fusions have increasingly become a defensive strategy against poor 
profitability where size is seen as the decisive factor for efficiency. The faith in the success of these 
mergers is very strong and they have become some sort of panacea against bad profitability (Alarik, 
1982). Related to hospitals this concern is voiced expressively in a recent study by Thomas Weil, 
author of ‘Hospital mergers: a panacea?’ (Weil, 2010). Posnett (2002) concludes that cost cannot 
generally be presumed to be lower or outcomes better in large hospitals. “The determinants of 
patient outcome are poorly understood, and the emphasis on volume as a proxy for the skill and 
experience of individual clinicians is probably misplaced” (p. 114). 
 
4.2 Quality of care 
In his book An Introduction to Quality Assurance in Health Care Donabedian (2003) defines quality of 
care as a product of two factors. Firstly the science and technology of health care and secondly the 
application of that science and technology in actual practice. He writes that that product can be 
characterized by several attributes that include efficacy, effectiveness, efficiency, optimality as well 
as acceptability, legitimacy and equity. Individually, or in combination, he argues that these can 
define and measure the magnitude of quality. This is a non-comprehensive list that can be both 
broadened and more detailed. Morris et al. (2007) make further categorizations of equity, defined as 
the fair distribution of health care in society, including aspects that are partly overlapping the 
attribute legitimacy described by Donabedian (2003). 
 
We will not delve into these aspects of acceptability (conformity to the wishes, desires, and 
expectations of patients and their families), equity (fairness) and legitimacy (conformity to social 
values, norms, laws etc). Instead we limit ourselves to describing efficacy, effectiveness, efficiency 
and optimality since our study is mainly oriented towards studying doctors, management and 
hospital processes and not the actual effect on patients. Furthermore, it is possible that a sufficient 
level of organisational efficiency is a prerequisite for the doctors to have the extra energy needed to 
make an additional effort in providing services that are for the well-being of the patient but not 
essential for their medical treatment. 
 
4.3 Efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency 
In health care literature there is an abundance of different ways of defining what in everyday speech 
probably most commonly is called efficiency. Synonyms or broader/more narrow definitions of the 
same concepts that we have come across in the health care literature are for example: economic 
efficiency, cost-effectiveness (Morris et al., 2007; Hallin & Siverbo, 2003; R. Axelsson, 1998); scale 
and technical efficiency (Harris, Ozgen & Ozcan, 2000); adaptive and allocative efficiency, (Elmqvist, 
2002; Morris et al., 2007) and ‘doing the right thing’ compared to ‘doing these things in the right 
15 
 
way’ (Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström (2000) have delved more into this 
subject and found further concepts such as clinical, managerial, production and distribution 
efficiency; operational and model outcome; as well as rationalization. Further concepts such as 
optimality, internal and external efficiency and productivity will be addressed shortly. 
 
4.3.1 Problems in distinguishing between the different concepts 
In the academic world a certain kind of vocabulary is used in order to be accurate when discussing 
various subjects in detail. This is important because it avoids misunderstandings and allows for 
reaching higher levels of knowledge. However, in everyday life these concepts might not always be 
used in the exact same way. This causes a problem in two ways. First there is a problem of definition. 
For example the concept productivity is sometimes used as a synonym for effectiveness (Baker, 1980, 
in L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström, 2000). Also, since both effectiveness and efficiency are integral 
parts of quality of care (Donabedian, 2003) these two concepts might overlap in our coming 
discussions. Furthermore our study is not limited to one of these concepts and there is no one 
English word that completely embraces productivity, effectiveness and efficiency etc. Thus we hereby 
notify our reader that we will try to use the most appropriate concept, but when speaking generally 
we will predominantly use efficiency even though we might refer to closely related concepts such as 
effectiveness as well.   
 
The reason to why we need to be able to speak generally about these concepts is due to our second 
problem: the problem of translation. Since we study a Swedish hospital merger the interviews are 
conducted in Swedish. In Swedish there are no equivalent words used to distinguish effectiveness, 
efficiency and efficacy. Instead the Swedish word “effektivitet” embraces all of these (L. Axelsson & 
Kullén Engström, 2000). There are existing words that do distinguish them partly but according to 
dictionaries (Norstedts engelsk-svenska ordbok, 1994) all the three concepts are translated to 
“effektivitet” while two of them are translated to “verkan”. From this follows that the meaning and 
application of the efficiency concept may sometimes be inconsistent and unclear (L. Axelsson & 
Kullén Engström, 2000). Hence our interview questions and corresponding answers regarding 
“effektivitet” are not distinguishing between the different concepts. The difference is not specified 
by participants and we do not ask our interviewees if they are aware of the difference. Having 
decided how to deal with the translation problem, the question is which concept to replicate in 
writing. In order to reflect the interviews properly, should we use “effectiveness” or “efficiency” 
when we discuss our empiric material, and not distinguish any of them in particular? We will try to 
use them as precisely as possible when the context makes is clear which term the participant refers 
to, but sometimes one of them will be used generally and possibly include the meaning of other 
concepts as well.  
 
Within Swedish literature this problem has been addressed by distinguishing between internal and 
external “effektivitet”. However, the use of the concept is poorly defined and inconsistently used by 
the different authors (L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström, 2000; Alarik, 1982; R. Axelsson, 1998; Hallin & 
Siverbo, 2003). While R. Axelsson (1998) writes that external efficiency refers to the satisfaction of 
human and social needs from health care and internal efficiency as productivity Hallin & Siverbo 
(2003) defines external as effectiveness and internal as efficiency and productivity. Thus they define 
external efficiency differently and by defining ‘internal efficiency’ as equaling efficiency and 
productivity they contradict Baker (1980, in L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström, 2000) who wrote that 
productivity usually is synonymous to effectiveness instead, as mentioned above.  
 
Our conclusion is that we have to choose which author’s definitions to follow. We have chosen the 
definitions used by Donabedian (2003) for two reasons: first, we think he explains them very well and 
thoroughly, and second, he is often referred to by other health literature authors discussing 
elements of efficiency.  
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4.3.2 Efficacy 
According to Donabedian (2003) efficacy is the ability to use the available science and technology in 
the most optimal way. That is, “the standard against which any improvement in health achieved in 
actual practice is to be compared” (p. 4). It is a product of research, experience, and professional 
consensus. Elmqvist (2002) writes that there is a gap between what medical care is technically and 
economically possible to provide. Hallin & Siverbo (2003) write that this already large gap between 
what the health care can do, and the access to resources, is likely to increase since the technological 
development is more rapid than the growth of resources.  
 
Donabedian (2003) writes that “efficacy is the ability of the science and technology of health care to 
bring about improvements in health when used under the most favourable circumstances” (p.4). Our 
interpretation of this is that efficacy is a measurement of how well the organisation achieves what it 
is supposed to achieve. A university hospital is assigned to provide more complicated and advanced 
medical care compared to a county hospital. Thus comparisons between how well they do based on 
efficiency and effectiveness might be unfair since the degree of difficulty is not the same. For 
example a clinic with ‘worse’ efficiency might actually provide a higher level of quality care due to 
the fact that their cases are relatively more difficult to treat (Fölster et al., 2003). Instead, efficacy 
may be a more relevant measure. The county hospitals’ clinics are measured after the standard that 
they are supposed to live up to while university hospitals’ clinics are measured according to the 
unique specialities that they are supposed to provide and the extra difficulty that involves. Hospitals 
could in that way be measured according to how well they make use of the scientific and 
technological possibilities at their disposal. 
 
4.3.4 Effectiveness 
According to L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström (2000) effectiveness includes both the level of 
improvement in health by provided care and how well the improvement in health matches what 
could be expected from optimal care. This corresponds to Donabedian’s (2003) definition: “the 
degree to which attainable improvements in health care are, in fact, attained” (p. 6). It is thus an 
assessment of how well the reasonably expected performance is achieved. The reasonable expected 
performance is what health care science and technology allows for, either ideally or under specific 
conditions. It is important to remember that this “best” or “standard” care against which 
effectiveness is measured is changing over time. There should be a continuous improvement over 
time in most hospitals where new knowledge and technology improves the care that can be 
provided, thus raising the bar for what is reasonably expected. Though, in worst case scenarios 
different events could also lower this standard.  
 
Other things to keep in mind according to Donabedian (2003) are that effectiveness should be seen 
as an ‘expected average’ of a larger sample. Thus individual or smaller samples of cases could have a 
bad or below standard outcome but the larger sample of cases, the total provided treatments of a 
hospital, could nevertheless be effective. It is also dependent on how one defines and measures 
“health”, which can be a tricky business and makes the outcome of the treatment hard to evaluate in 
some cases. 
 
As mentioned above there are problems of definition concerning, mainly, productivity and 
effectiveness. Productivity is an often used concept but it seems to be poorly defined. According to 
Fölster et al. (2003) productivity is calculated on the input variables only, and thus is a measurement 
for how well an organisation uses its resources irrespective of what it produces. This corresponds to 
the SOU 1997:28 definition used by Lundquist (1997, in L. Axelsson & Kullén Engström, 2000) “that 
the cost of each measure must be as low as possible” (p.3), but is in direct opposition to Elmqvist’s 
(2002) definition of the same concept. He states that performance, in relation to costs, should have 
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desirable effects. Quinn & Rohrbaug (1981) asserted that no commonly accepted definition of 
effectiveness had emerged and that the concept had proved to be elusive. If we consider how 
Donabedian (2003) defines effectiveness it cannot be seen as synonymous to any of these. 
 
4.3.5 Efficiency 
The term “efficiency” is “the ability to lower the cost of care without diminishing attainable 
improvements in health” (Donabedian, 2003, p.9) or with a different wording: “the number of units 
produced for a given number of inputs” (Quinn & Rohrbaug, 1981 p.123). Improved efficiency can be 
achieved in two ways, either by lowering the cost relative to the care provided or by increasing the 
care provided relative to the cost of that care. It is not enough to lower the costs to increase 
efficiency since the care provided has to be either intact or improved. We would like to add to this 
definition that theoretically the care could in fact be decreased as well but only as long as it 
decreases relatively less to the decrease in costs. Though lowering care because of an increased 
efficiency is probably not something that would be well received by the majority of a hospital’s 
stakeholders such as the public or politicians. In public organisations the aims of reforms are 
predominantly to lower costs but maintaining the same output (Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). Experiences 
from Swedish health care reforms show that hospitals that increased performance at the same cost 
succeeded initially but experienced cost escalating later on. The results have been that counties are 
recommended to reduce costs at maintained levels of performance (Elmqvist, 2002). 
  
Donabedian (2003) writes that there are three efficiencies in health care: (1) Clinical efficiency: 
prescribing and implementing more efficient care that is dependent on knowledge, judgment and 
skill. (2) Managerial efficiency: The efficient production of goods and services through the application 
of methods such as running at higher occupancy rate, reduction of errors (and thus costs) through 
stricter procedures as well as task and hierarchical specialization. He points out that “without the 
participation and consent of clinicians, some of these changes would be difficult to introduce” (p. 10). 
(3)Distributional efficiency: the allocation of resources to groups of patients in proportion to the 
expected improvement in health. Thus resources might be prioritized to subgroups who are either 
sicker, more likely to benefit from the care, more likely to benefit from the care for a longer period of 
time, those that can be treated at a proportionately lower cost or a combination of two or more of 
these alternatives. 
 
4.3.6 Relating the three concepts to each other 
As we believe that these three concepts might cause some confusion and be used differently by 
different individuals we feel a need for a further visualization of the concepts, both in order to 
explain them as well as to describe our understanding of them. We have created the chart below to 
explain this. The basic principles are that hospital A and B have the same assignments and the same 
specialist clinics. That is they are supposed to be able to provide the same health care and have equal 
access to the nation’s accumulated science and technology. The determinants of their success are 
thus how they make use of this through, for example, strategic organising and management. 
 
Hospital Cost Cured patients Conclusion 
A  200 / 400 Hospital A has a higher efficacy as it can cure more patients than 
hospital B. But the effectiveness is the same for both (50 %). B   100 / 200 
A 20 100 / 200 Both hospitals are equally effective (50 %) but A has a lower 
resource input and is thus more efficient. B 50 100 / 200 
A 20 100 / 200 Hospital B is more effective (it cures more patients than A) but 
resource-wise it is less efficient. With a 150 % higher resource 
input it only cures 5 % more patients. 
B 50 105 / 200 
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The reason why we have several different ways of defining what is good performance is probably 
because there are different views on what is desirable. Quinn & Rohrbaug (1981) discuss how 
different viewpoints on effectiveness are dependent on individuals’ values, hierarchical positions, 
type of unit and several other factors. Even if we focus on one of these concepts there will still be 
someone who is not happy with the result because something else is lacking. Thus, the goal with all 
these measurements is often to reach an optimum. This is the amount and combination of different 
variables which is deemed to be as perfect as possible and that most people would agree on. 
Optimum can be described as the point below which one can still improve and above which the 
benefits achieved through further input are much too costly in comparison to that benefit. The 
problem with optimality is that one needs perfect information, which is impossible to acquire. 
Hospitals are complex organisations with various groups of actors with different ambitions. This 
renders management more difficult, especially considering the different actors’ bounded rationality, 
the inability to make perfect decisions due to limited information and cognitive ability (Hallin & 
Siverbo, 2003). With all the apparent as well as theoretical variables that must be considered, 
optimality is probably impossible to achieve. Even if it was achieved it would not be possible to know 
if it was the true optimum or if it in some way could be improved further.  
 
In addition there are, as Donabedian (2003) points out, serious ethical implications involved in 
optimality. For example, how do you value a year of life gained at a certain age when comparing it to 
the costs of that treatment? He discusses one aspect of this which he calls “social legitimacy” or 
“social acceptability”, referring to the disparity between individuals and collectives in their views of 
efficiency and optimality. Individuals are mainly concerned with what they pay and what care they 
receive while society is more concerned with the efficient distribution of tax money, the 
immunization of sufficient amounts of individuals to prevent diseases, or the longevity of certain 
individuals where, for example, younger individuals might receive a higher priority than the older. 
Morris et al. (2007) discuss different aspects of ethical imperatives, prioritising and their relation to 
cost-efficiency. Swedish law on how to prioritise in health care is based on a governmental 
investigation, ‘the health care’s hard decisions’, discussing ethical principles (SOU, 1995:5). Our own 
conclusion is that if ethical implications are involved then optimality can differ depending on who 
you ask. This means that effectiveness and efficiency can be viewed differently by groups of 
individuals with different backgrounds and in different positions (see Quinn & Rohrbaug, 1980). 
 
4.4 Professional bureaucracies 
Within healthcare literature the doctors are usually defined as professionals (Svenér, 2010; Nilsson, 
1999; L. Axelsson, 2000; Olafsson, 2008). We will describe the implications of this concept and we 
will mainly base our literature review on the works of Mintzberg (1993) and Freidson (1975; 1994), 
two authors who are frequently referred to when discussing professionalism as an important aspect 
of health care organisations. 
 
4.4.1 Professions and professionalism 
The definition of what a profession is and how professionalism should be defined has been much 
debated for a long time and there is no real consensus on how to delineate the concept (Alvesson, 
2004; Freidson, 1994). After a comprehensive discussion on the different connotations and 
denotations of the concept profession, Freidson (1994) concludes that “all serious writers on the 
topic should be obliged to display to readers what they have in mind when the word is used” (p. 27). 
His own definition of the word is “an occupation that controls its own work, organized by a special 
set of institutions sustained in part by a particular ideology of expertise and service” and 
professionalism is thus referring to “that ideology and special set of institutions” (p. 10).  
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Professions should thus be separated from the broad strata of varied occupations signified mostly by 
their prestigious status and relatively high education instead of their actual occupational skills. 
Sometimes the word profession is simply used to describe one’s occupation, either to describe the 
current job and what one does for a living or to separate oneself from an “amateur” (Alvesson, 
2004). When someone does a bad job it is said to be “unprofessional” without regards as to whether 
it was, in fact, something truly professional to begin with or not. Thus the label of being professional 
is something that most workers strive towards as it indicates both high status and superior skills and 
knowledge. But it is not in that sense that we use it here. In addition to the previously mentioned 
definition used by Friedson (1994) we adhere to a number of “more or less accepted criteria for a real 
or true profession” summarized by Alvesson (2004, p.31): 
 
 The occupation is based on a systematic, scientifically based theory. 
 There is long and standardized formal education.  
 A strong professional association regulates its members. 
 Members have autonomy in the sense that professional knowledge rather than bureaucratic 
position governs decisions and work within the professional sphere. 
 A code of ethics is established by the education. 
 There is a distinct occupational culture.  
 There is client-orientation.  
 The occupation is socially sanctioned and authorized. 
 There are criteria for certification.   
 There is a monopoly on a particular labour market through self-regulation of entry to the 
occupation. 
 
When discussing the ambivalence of the exact definition Alvesson (2004) points out that if we follow 
these criteria strictly it is probably only doctors and perhaps dentists, vets and psychologists who 
would qualify as true professionals. With this he means that the other three classical professions, 
accountancy, law and clergy, would fail on the first criteria as their disciplines are more based on 
social rules, norms and tradition rather than true science. However, there are several other 
occupations that are often referred to as professions and as such it would probably be better to 
define them according to how high they score on the professional scale. That is: according to how 
many of these criteria they fit in with (Alvesson, 2004). Irrespective of where we draw the line of 
demarcation doctors score very high on the profession scale and what is most important to 
remember in our discussion is that we do not refer to professionals in terms of status, education and 
skills. These are inherent parts of a profession but are not sufficient for a complete and accurate 
understanding of the concept, in the way we use it. 
 
4.4.2 The structure of professional bureaucracies 
It can be argued that in the light of the diffusion of knowledge and techniques which lead to an 
intensified competition on the business market the traditional forms of competitiveness such as cost, 
technology, distribution, manufacturing and production costs have been reduced to table stakes. 
That, is they are mandatory to have but they are no longer the key to success as they can all be 
copied or substituted. Instead the only competitive weapon left is organisation (Ulrich, 1997). After a 
longitudinal research with an international comparison Fölster et al. (2003) asserts that the Swedish 
health care does not have any resource problems. Instead the existing problems are because of the 
lack of effective organisation and management. Mintzberg (1993) uses a similar argument when 
asking what is more important for the effective functioning of our organisations than the structural 
design.  
 
Mintzberg (1993) argues that the structural design should be adapted to the contingency factors of 
the situation in which the organisation is operating. One of the contingency factors discussed is 
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environment, which could be divided into either stable or dynamic and simple or complex. When 
combined, four different types of environments emerge, as shown in the matrix below. He claims 
that hospitals are typical examples of organisations operating in complex and stable organisations 
(also confirmed by Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). During the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the 
previously strong idea of planning was increasingly replaced by the idea of decentralisation in 
Swedish health care (R. Axelsson, 1998). According to Mintzberg’s (1993) matrix this environment 
usually causes organisations to adopt a decentralized and bureaucratic structure. While the other 
structures rely on standardization of work processes, mutual adjustment or direct supervision, the 
decentralized and bureaucratic structure is reliant on standardization of skills.  
 
Standardization of skills means that the work is rather predictable; a patient with a certain problem 
receives a predefined treatment. But as the art of medicine is very difficult to comprehend it must be 
decentralized and the doctors are given what can be called professional autonomy. Thus the power 
and responsibility is put in the hands of highly trained professionals who can understand the very 
complex but yet routine work (Freidson, 1994; Mintzberg, 1993). They do not have anyone who tells 
them what to do; they take their own decisions and perform the operational work according to the 
industry’s well-defined, standardized and normative rules, in our case the rules of successful and 
secure health care. 
 
 Stable Dynamic 
 
Complex 
Decentralized 
Bureaucratic 
(standardization of skills) 
Decentralized 
Organic 
(mutual adjustment) 
 
Simple 
Centralized 
Bureacratic 
(standardization of work processes) 
Centralized 
Organic 
(direct supervision) 
Mintzberg (1993: 144)  
 
Mintzberg (1993) concludes that certain contingency factors are associated with the use of certain 
design parameters. These situational factors can be grouped into four categories: age & size, 
technical system, power and the above mentioned environment. He argues that the effective 
organisation select its design parameters to fit the situation. Hence five structural configurations 
emerge: the simple structure, the machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy, the 
divisionalised form and the adhocracy. 
 
4.4.3 The professional bureaucracy  
Hospitals are typical examples of professional bureaucracies. The use of the term bureaucratic could 
be slightly confusing. Freidson (1975) makes a difference between the bureaucratic model and the 
professional model and says that the “bureaucratic hierarchy and authority of bureaucratic offices 
are foreign to the profession” (p. 9). Mintzberg (1993) agrees with Freidson that the bureaucratic 
hierarchy and authority do not exist in the professional bureaucracy; control is exercised in other 
ways. He refers to the term in the sense that standardization leads to a certain kind of 
bureaucratisation and writes that it is important to remember that an organisation can be 
bureaucratic without being centralised. Freidson is, however, aware of this, at that time, rather new 
concept and mentions, in ‘Doctoring Together’ (1975), the “recent discussion of such ‘professional 
bureaucracy’” (p.10). He refers to it as a result of the preceding decade’s pressure towards 
strengthening administrative powers through legislation, consolidation and formal organisation of 
practices. Thus, the previously almost completely independent profession had become increasingly 
subjected to indirect bureaucratic control while still keeping a lot of the old era’s characteristics of an 
autonomous profession. Four important concepts in the professional bureaucracy are discussed in 
detail below.  
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Standardization of skills: When the core work is predetermined and predictable it is, in effect, 
standardised. However, in highly complex work there can be no vertical specialization where 
managers supervise the operators’ work. Instead the power is disseminated to the operators, in our 
case the doctors. In order for the professional to both perform and control the work the organisation 
has to rely on their previously achieved knowledge and skills. The reliance on knowledge and skills, 
which is achieved through training and indoctrination, is the reason to why the profession requires a 
standardization of skills. This standardization is what Mintzberg (1993) calls the prime coordinating 
mechanism of the professional bureaucracy. 
 
Autonomy: When so much power is put in the hands of the professionals they receive an extensive 
autonomy. It is not the manager who coordinates the actual work; instead this is directed by the 
professional worker who is dominant in the division of labour (Freidson, 1994). Thus, instead of being 
coordinated by superiors the doctors are coordinated by the established standards of the profession. 
There are important benefits inherited in the profession’s decentralized power and extensive 
autonomy. The professionals tend to become highly responsible and motivated with a strong 
dedication to their work and the clients they serve. This makes this type of organisation unique 
compared to machine bureaucracies, where a barrier is put between the operator and the client, 
minimising any personal relationship (Mintzberg, 1993). 
 
The autonomy allows the professionals to perfect their skills without interference and this creates a 
sense of security for the patient who knows that the doctor has performed a certain kind of surgery 
so many times that the possibility of mistakes has been minimized. Thus the patient on the surgery 
table can feel safe, knowing that the professional about to perform the operation will draw on vast 
quantities of experience and skill, apply these in a perfected procedure, and will be highly motivated 
in doing their best (Mintzberg, 1993). 
 
Training and indoctrination: Being the key part of the organisation means that the professionals are 
in control of their own work, and perform their work relatively independently with the clients. This is 
often done without observation from colleagues and even less observation from management 
(Freidson, 1994). In professional organisations there is indirect and direct social control. Indirect 
social control refers to restrictive licensing, formal training and educational requirements. Direct 
social control exists in the form of self-control: behaviours controlled by virtue of training and 
dedication from schooling, as well as collegial control exercised in the interaction with other 
professionals (Freidson, 1975). Mintzberg (1993) refers to training as the process by which job-
related skills and knowledge are taught, while indoctrination is the process by which organisational 
norms are acquired. Indoctrination can often have a negative connotation but in this case it is 
preferable even if it can have negative aspects if bad organisational norms are adopted.  
 
Part of the indoctrination takes place already during the doctor’s education, at the university they 
are given clues about how a doctor should behave. However, it is not until they start working that 
the true indoctrination takes place, which socializes the new doctor into certain routines, considering 
certain ethical aspects and in that way being socialized into a certain kind of organisational culture 
(Mintzberg, 1993). Conversely, indoctrination also serves as collegial control. If a doctor observes 
malpractice by another doctor he must intervene. It is common that a new doctor shadows senior 
doctors for advice for a very long time before they start working more independently. Despite the 
extensive medical education both on-the-job training and indoctrination takes roughly 5 years, 
sometimes longer, before the doctor has accumulated a satisfactory amount of knowledge and skills 
in order to become a skilful and independent doctor. Doctor’s usually do not see themselves, or 
other doctors, as “finished” or “real” doctors until they are senior doctors (Svenér, 2010: 27).   
 
22 
 
Professional identity: The professionals’ rather protected labour market is according to Freidson 
(1994) a source of loyalty and identity for the professional membership. The future life career is 
relatively secured and as it becomes a central life-interest it also becomes a source of personal 
identification. The doctors are loyal towards their colleagues, the patients and their relatives (L. 
Axelsson, Edgren & Svensson, 1999). Thus they are loyal to the profession, not the place where they 
happen to practice it and are more inclined than other employees to leave the organisation if they 
cannot work on their own terms. The professional requires autonomy and “when the professional 
does not get the autonomy he feels he requires, he is tempted to pick up his kit bag of skills and move 
on” (Mintzberg, 1993, p.195). 
 
4.5 Organisational Change, Management, and Merger theory 
This study adopts an open frame of mind when it comes to the application of theoretical concepts to 
our results. Because of this, only the main areas of vast spectrum of organisation literature are here 
reviewed. The specific theoretical concepts with relevance to our findings are, instead, presented in 
more detail in the Discussion of our findings in chapter 5.  
 
4.5.1 Organisational Change and Management Literature 
Some Organisational management, or structural theory, is deemed appropriate to review in this 
study. This section will deal, in short, with models and theories such as the Value Chain analysis, Lean 
production systems, Job specialisation and Output control.  
 
Porter’s Value Chain analysis (1985) is a model for determining where competitive advantage can be 
realised. It presumes that the business comprises some type of core business, or core operations, 
where value is created, and various support functions which should aid the core operations to realise 
valuable processes. The core business includes inbound and outbound logistics, central operations, 
marketing & sales and customer (or after sale) service. The support functions include firm 
infrastructure (such as management, planning, accounting), Human Resources (hiring, training), 
Technology (such as IT-systems) and procurement. 
 
Lean production system was conceived by Ohno and Shingo, through the Toyota Production System 
in Japan, and popularized in the west by Womack et al (1990). The general idea of Lean is to seek the 
perfection of value creating processes through the elimination of waste (e.g. Proudlove, Moxham, 
Boaden, 2008). The goal is to support the value creating processes, and reduce other efforts. IT-
systems in Lean are supposed to assist in the value creation just as any other function (Raman, 1998). 
Kaizen is one of the pillars of Lean, meaning continual improvement, and Just in time production is 
another, the central idea being that material and goods should be at the right place at the right time 
in order to eliminate warehousing and spillage. Other related management systems, that will 
however not be expanded upon, are Total Quality Management and Six Sigma.  
 
Job specialisation was first revealed as a concept by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations (1776, cited 
in McGuffog & Wadsley, 1999). He stated that the division of labour increases productivity and 
consequently the unit cost of production, making the business more efficient. Mintzberg (1993) 
among others expanded on this, and proposes that the reason for this productivity increase is that 
the employees, through repetition, gain experience which can be used to hasten the process, 
rationalise the process or improve it with new tasks or tools. Mintzberg (1993) also reflected on the 
problem with job specialisation; that it requires greater efforts in communication and coordination of 
the organisation and could also lead to lessened employee satisfaction as they see their field, and 
areas to influence, decreasing.  
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Output control can be seen as a rational solution to some problems of management (L. Axelsson, 
2000). However, the problem is that in politically led organisations, such as the public health care, 
some goals are favoured above others that are not too easily measured. Also the premise that goals 
can be fulfilled through centralised managing and decision-making is also questioned. Kirchhof (1974 
in L. Axelsson, 2000) argues that there are three components to output control: formulation of goals, 
involvement of personnel in decision processes, and that the goals should always be possible to 
achieve. This is most effectively done with a decentralised division of labour and high degrees of 
autonomy, with the support of hard and soft data, i.e. both numbers and, for example, employee 
satisfaction (L. Axelsson, 2000). L. Axelsson (2000) also argues that such control demands good 
knowledge of work processes, how they relate to each other and what is essential for the outcome.  
 
4.5.2 Merger Theory 
Mergers can be categorized into three types: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. Each 
type corresponds to a specific need of the merging firms. Horizontal mergers combine two 
competitive firms with the same set of products and customers. Vertical mergers are when two firms 
want to get access to the whole distribution chain. Conglomerate mergers occur when two firms 
want to diversify their business (Malmström & Orre, 2010). 
 
It is pertinent to note that according to studies within the M&A field, few mergers actually succeed in 
reaching their expected outcomes. Only 30 % of the mergers are successful (Jordan & Stuart, 2000). 
There are several examples of this from various business areas, with failures rates ranging from 46% 
(Kitching, 1974 in Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006) all the way to 77% (Marks, 1988 in Choi, 2011), 
while Jordan & Stuart (2000) asserts that a mere 30% of mergers are successful. It is also appropriate 
to note, however, that many of these differences and measurements vary depending on the criteria 
for success that are used. 
 
In general, Mergers tend to happen for a set of specific reasons, such as creating rapid growth, 
improving competitive advantage, realizing synergies through increasing financial and operational 
efficiency such as pure results, reduction of excess capacity and increased negotiating power as well 
as to optimize conditions for research and education (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Fulop et al., 2002, 2005). 
Most of the times, it is a complex pattern of motives and no single explanation suffices (Trautwein, 
1990). Different classifications abound and models for how the field should be organised. For reasons 
of convenience, we have chosen to adopt that used by Choi (2011), from whom the structure of this 
chapter is inspired.  
 
The field of Merger and Acquisitions Theory (M&A) is quite divided, and has been formed from 
constituents of several disciplines, such as Economics, Finance, Strategic Management and Social 
Psychology (Choi, 2011). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991 in Choi, 2011) identify four different 
categories, or schools of theory. The first, the capital markets school, or the finance school, is mostly 
focused on the issue of whether mergers increase or decrease value for shareholders of the firms. 
Hence, the financial performance on an aggregate level, measured as shareholder value, is typically a 
central theme of this school. Being of lesser consequence in a context of publicly held professional 
service firms, such as public hospitals, and with more of a quantitative research focus, this school of 
theory will not be used or developed further in the course of this study. The other main schools of 
theory are the strategy (or strategic management) school, the organisational behaviour school and 
the process school. The strategy school is primarily concerned with finding ways of maximizing firm 
performance and profit and strategies of avoiding obstacles to new value creation. Research also 
centers on finding the types of mergers that are most likely to be successful and thus the evaluation 
of the concept of “strategic fit”. The organisational behaviour school rose in an attempt to explain 
why so many mergers fail to realize expected gains, and has its origins in social psychology, 
organisational behaviour and human resource management. The school focuses on employee 
24 
 
concerns and resistance to change and tries to explain failure in mergers as a cumulative 
dysfunctional impact the integration process has on individuals in the organisation, in other words 
due to a poor organisational or cultural fit. The process school tries to chart the processes of the 
merger to the outcomes of the merger. Hence, research looks at how management acts to create 
value in the integration process and what change approach is adopted, such as incremental change. 
This school also identifies the merger phenomenon as highly context sensitive.  
In line with the research question this paper sets out to answer, the organisational behaviour and 
process schools of M&A theory are the most relevant, and much of the adopted theory will share 
these origins.  
 
4.5.3 Motivation and Resistance 
The organisational behaviour school includes concepts such as employee motivation and resistance. 
Locke & Latham (2004) argue that a merger may affect the organisational climate and employee 
motivation. The organisation is dependent on the cognitive work of employees, something that 
becomes even more apparent during large-scale organisational changes like a merger. The outcome 
of this is two-fold; it can cause negative effects such as strong resistance and sabotage, but it can also 
result in positive effects such as renewed confidence, engagement and commitment from employees 
(Bhal, Bhaskar & Ratnam, 2009). Employee motivation is affected by various internal and external 
factors, such as the individual desire to work, or the reward in recognition of work well done 
(Tremblay et.al., 2009). Resistance can take many forms and is a real problem for change managers. 
It is a common concept that has been charted thoroughly (e.g. Ford, Ford & D’Amelio, 2008, 
Bringselius, 2008). Most researchers have the conception that resistance is an irrational and 
dysfunctional reaction caused only by change recipients and must be countered, but some now start 
to see this differently (Ford et.al., 2008). By assuming that resistance is necessarily bad the change 
agents may miss the potential contributions of increasing the likelihood of successful implementation 
through helping building momentum for change and eliminating impractical and counterproductive 
elements in the design and conduct of the change process (Ford et.al., 2008). Also, using a top down 
approach to change management, and not listen to those who are experienced in the organisation, 
under appreciate the need for straight communication and neglect the importance of psychological 
contracts are ways in which change agents sometimes contribute to the occurrence of the very 
reactions they label as resistance through their own actions or inactions. This also increases the risk 
for the emergence of change fatigue and inoculation, as discussed by Palmer et al. (2009) and Ford, 
Ford & D’Amelio (2008).  
 
4.5.4 Merger and Change Management  
Studies have shown that the most effective senior managers recognise their limited power to 
mandate corporate renewal from the top. Instead they define their roles as creating a climate for 
change (Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990). Top-down approaches can obstruct the optimal integration 
between service providers (Kodner & Spreeuwenberg, 2002) as well as obstructing the chain of care 
development. Chances for successful outcomes are also higher if initiated locally by dedicated 
professionals (Ahgren, 2007). Weil (2010) also argues for a bottom-up perspective on change 
management, that practitioners should be engaged early and often, to become more involved in the 
merger discussions, the implementation and the evaluation, in order to achieve positive results. 
Alarik (1982) also supports the idea of involving a greater number of people in the plans by asserting 
that merger results usually get worse if individuals with important business related knowledge are 
not consulted, especially since organisational-specific knowledge usually is spread in the organisation 
and not concentrated to one specific group of people.  
 
The speed of mergers has been debated by many researchers. Today there are different views on 
what is more effective, a big bang approach or a slower, gradual change. The principle of speed has 
been advocated, for example, by Jordan & Stuart (2000), while others, such as Amis, Slack & Hinings 
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(2004), argue that large-scale and quick changes might hinder the establishment of trustful 
relationships and invoke resistance. The problems of cumulative changes are also recognized. The 
use of a rapid progression of change programs is according to Beer, Eisenstat & Spector (1990) often 
a result of senior managers wanting to try another change program after previous ones have failed. 
The problem is that it only exacerbates the problem because they are designed to cover everyone 
and everything but end up covering nobody and nothing particularly well. It may also lead to change 
fatigue (Palmer et al., 2009) and, thus, a decreased future change potential.  
 
This concludes the short literary review conducted in relation to our study. In the next chapter, 
our empirical results will be presented, divided on the different objectives outlined previously.  
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V – Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
5.1 How to measure effectiveness/efficiency 
We will here present our findings in response to our first objective with this study: How do doctors 
and managers believe efficiency is and/or should be measured? 
 
Finding a good measurement of health care effectiveness and quality is an agreed upon dilemma by 
all participants in our study, though some put more emphasis on the existing problems than others. 
Top management wants evidence-based data to evaluate changes in relation to improved patient 
care, work environment, patient security and, not least, improved financials. But they recognize that 
this is problematic and that there are no perfect ways to capture all the different aspects of hard and 
soft data. Hard data such as duration of surgical operations, surgery preparation time and numbers 
of patients received or treated are easy to measure but do not accurately describe how well the 
patient is doing after the treatment. However, this is not unique to SUS or the Swedish health care 
system:  
 
“In all of Sweden, in all of Europe, people are looking for effective measurements but 
those real ‘super-measurements’ have not been found. Instead it varies; they measure 
some values but do not cover the rest. That is the dilemma with the health care for the 
moment when it comes to follow-up and such things, to find the correct measurements. 
We have some colleagues at LUSEM who have spent quite a few years twisting and 
turning this problem to find solutions, but it is not financial measurements that work.” 
(Top manager) 
 
Production in health care is measured using the nationally defined DRG values, weighing the 
resources required to treat each patient. This is also the base for the way health care is financed by 
the Region and how the hospital is paid for each patient. Hence, top management uses the DRG 
value of each patient, put in relation to hours worked, to get a working measurement of relative 
efficiency at the hospital. That is: how much is produced per time unit. For top management this is a 
simple but very easy way of communicating efficiency, but they also recognize its flaws. They look at 
how they can develop more sophisticated production measurements and do not in spirit approve 
with the fact that they are today paid for quantity instead of quality. To measure how many patients 
have been given a better quality of life would be better than measuring number of surgeries, which 
does not take into account possible complications or secondary effects that require more treatment. 
Thus, top managers recognize that every way of measuring has its drawbacks. Nevertheless, they 
stress that even though the measurement is not perfect, one has to stick to something in order to 
manage the organisation and be able to do follow-ups. Simply declaring that the existing 
measurement is unfair will not lead anywhere unless one can come up with a better way of 
measuring.  
 
Middle management thinks that the production per time measurement is good to have access to, but 
they would like to relate effectiveness more to production per quality. Quality could be measured as 
number of complications per surgery, relapses and readmissions of patients and follow-up surgeries. 
It could also be put into relation to groups of patients, such as the diabetes group, to see how to 
prevent reduced vision and relate this to the costs of treating that group.  
 
One middle manager thinks that the use of hard data, such as number of surgeries performed, is not 
that useful considering the complexity of health care. Another one thinks that even though they are 
not ideal they can be somewhat useful for benchmarking. However, to get reliable results one must 
standardise as many other variables as possible in recognition of confounding factors. There are 
many examples of publications done focusing on some kind of measurement, but not all of them are 
viable, according to the middle manager.  
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“For example, one study published the best intensive care units (ICU), based on mortality 
rates 30 days after ICU treatment. They found that Ystad had the best ICU in Sweden. 
Congratulations Ystad, right? But what type of patients do they have in comparison to 
other ICUs? You can’t compare that.” (Middle Manager) 
 
The manager also mentions that, internationally if considering a lot of such different factors, the 
Swedish public health care is most likely less effective over all.  
 
The doctors’ views on how to measure effectiveness is to a large extent the same as the 
management’s. They believe that most of the current measurements are misguiding, and that it 
should be more related to quality. They recognize that it is complicated and that today, the only 
viable measurements are the number of patients seen or the number of surgeries conducted, even 
though they would like it to be more related to quality. Some also think the measurements can be 
quite unfair since one doctor might treat a few very complicated cases that take a lot of time but is 
still being measured and compared to someone who has treated several patients with a simpler 
diagnosis and treatment. Also, it is noted by one doctor that they themselves rate the nature of the 
diagnosis, so in case of complications some may consciously or unconsciously rate the patient as 
more difficult, thus giving a biased rating.  
 
What the doctors react most strongly towards is how the management follows the economic 
incentives established by the financial system instead of prioritizing what medically is the most 
sound. The financial system has several side effects which in the end forces the doctors to prioritize 
treatment to patients they do not think should be prioritized. 
 
“There is a big difference depending on whether you admit someone for post-op 
observation or not. For some surgeries you lose money if you do not admit the patients 
because you do not get as much money for them.” (Doctor) 
 
The most frequently mentioned case is the DRG weighting of cataracts: 
 
“A cataract surgery that you can do in eight minutes today was very complicated ten to 
fifteen years ago; there we still get a lot of money. But no one says anything since it gives 
so much money and there are such big volumes that it saves all the rest. So there are 
areas where it is very askew.” (Doctor) 
 
“(…) Cataract is not a dangerous disease, it is just ageing. You will not go blind by not 
operating it until after three years, really nothing happens, and then we do not have 
time with the diabetics who get bleedings in the bottom of the eye. Because they are on 
the waiting list and cannot come in to the doctor who is busy doing cataract surgeries all 
the time. And they go blind. And the management knows this!” (Doctor) 
 
“(…) it is because we get money if we operate them. And it is a political decision. 
Cataract is something that that the politicians like. They understand it increases the 
quality of life to make that kind of surgery one year earlier. But they do not see that 
there are others that we do not have time to treat.” (Doctor) 
 
Dependent on the financial incentives for the hospital, these treatments are prioritized above others, 
such as the diabetics, sometimes leading to a queue build up that may lead to more severe 
complications for those patients.  
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5.1.a How to measure effectiveness/efficiency – Discussion  
The problems with measuring efficiency might be a reason to why other problems exist within the 
health care sector. This is probably because the health care sector is characterized by three different 
actor groups that have their specific set of norms and values which often result in different desires 
and conflicts (Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). Measurements are needed in order to perform good 
management which is crucial for the effectiveness of the organisation. According to L. Axelsson, 
Kullén Engström & Edgren (2000) the different actors’ educational and work background influence 
how they act. Those close to the day to day operations see themselves as spokesmen for the 
patients. The senior administrators describe their actions as rational and consider their most 
important duty to be to implement political decisions. The politicians emphasise current financial 
conditions rather than current health policy. The differing values will result in different groups 
wanting to use different measurements as the main or most important measurements. The difficulty 
in reaching agreement on valid follow-up instruments is an obstacle that has to be overcome in order 
to achieve increased effectiveness and productivity in the health care organisation (L. Axelsson & 
Kullén Engström, 2000). The problems that the doctors mention in our study can be attributed to the 
balancing between emphasising either economic efficiency or medical effectiveness.  
 
When an organisation is subject to pressures with incompatible signals it might lead to contradictory 
messages being sent to the organisation and insufficient correspondence between idea and practice. 
When there is no correspondence between what is said and what is done the result is hypocrisy 
which in time leads to an increasingly expressed despise for those who take the decisions. This is a 
situation that easily emerges in complex professional organisations such as health care, especially 
when governed by politicians (Elmqvist, 2002; L. Axelsson, Kullén Engström & Edgren, 2000). The 
governmental investigation leading to the legislation on priorities within health care is based on 
ethical principles which put the principle of need above the principle of cost efficiency (SOU, 1995:5). 
This ethical order of precedence is in correspondence with the professional ethics of doctors 
discussed in the theoretical chapter of professional bureaucracies. The prioritizing of cataract 
surgeries over for example diabetic patients in our study shows an example of how the ethical 
considerations established by law and profession clashes with the economical considerations 
established by politicians and exercised by the management. When economic incentives override the 
doctors’ medical expertise in terms of which patients’ needs should be prioritized the doctors 
become frustrated. In the end it might lead to increasing mistrust between doctors and 
management/politicians as disagreements grow regarding how health care is governed. 
Florence Nightingale apparently phrased the problem quite simply in relation to quality 
management: 
 
“The ultimate goal is to manage quality. But you cannot manage it until you have a way 
to measure it, and you cannot measure it until you can monitor it.” 
(Nightingale, in Arah et al., 2003: 377) 
 
We can confirm that the same sentiment goes for efficiency in our study of the SUS merger.  
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5.2 Purpose of the merger 
When doing a major organisational change, or any kind of change for that matter, the purpose is 
most likely to improve something. It could be to improve the input, output, effectiveness or 
efficiency etc. To identify the purpose behind a costly and cumbersome transformation is a way to 
identify what is valued and what is seen as effective enough to make that change happen. The 
purpose of the SUS hospital merger has been much debated and in our study we have found several 
different ideas of what the purpose might or might not have been, or if there was any at all.  
 
5.2.1 The official purpose – economic or not 
According to the Proluma web page (skane.se/proluma) the objectives of the merger were to attract, 
concentrate and develop competence, which in turn would lead to a better business, care quality and 
research. It was also to strengthen economic capacity through realizing synergies, increase efficiency 
and improve the productivity. The SUS merger had the purpose to utilize the collected resources in 
order to achieve increased national and international competitiveness. The secondary objectives 
were to increase competence and improve the clinical research and business through establishing a 
high enough critical mass of patients (Region Skåne, 2010b). In the two processes it is thus possible 
to identify a slight difference between the wordings of the two purposes. 
 
Much of the debate surrounding the merger has been about whether the purpose of the merger was 
of en economic character or not. According to the top management the purpose was not economical 
and they are emphasizing this strongly. Instead it is to increase the competitiveness locally, nationally 
and globally. It is a competition about making the inhabitants stay for treatment in Skåne or to 
attract patients from other regions or countries. It is also a competition of being selected for major 
assignments such as national health care (Rikssjukvård), where there are only two hospitals in 
Sweden who deal with a certain kind of highly specialized health care, or the placing of large 
institutions such as the European Institute for Communicable Disease Control, which is mentioned as 
a failure where Stockholm easily won the assignment due to competition between Lund and Malmö. 
But what is most frequently mentioned and emphasized is the competitive power of research and 
competitive ability to receive research funding.  
 
Among the doctors the perceived purposes are not in accordance and three categories can be 
identified. First, some doctors say that the official purpose was some kind of increase of competence, 
competitiveness or synergies, either one of them or a combination, and that they had been told that 
there were no financial purposes. Among these doctors there were those who either bluntly said that 
they did not believe it was so, they believed there were financial reasons for the merger, and there 
were those who said that they hoped the official purposes were true and that it was not the 
economical purposes that governed the merger. None of these doctors believed the top 
management’s reasons entirely. Second, there were some doctors who said that reasons were 
entirely economical and accepted this as perfectly normal. They showed no signs of knowing that the 
management have been denying this, nor any signs of valuing the legitimacy of this purpose in any 
way other than saying that they failed to accomplish this. Third, there were those who said that the 
purposes had changed over time.  
 
*Interviewer: What was the purpose with the merger?+ “Well, that is interesting because 
back then it was said that it was because of economical reasons, what was stated during 
the presentation. When this was questioned, it was apparently no longer so, instead 
there was the competitive power that would be strengthened, outwards. If it was against 
Copenhagen or Stockholm or Göteborg who were a threat, I do not know. But it shifted; 
if you questioned one or the other reason, then it was changed. And that gave us a very 
strange picture of why it was like this. It started a lot of talk and intrigues. (…) It was 
30 
 
presented as purely economic; the division manager even showed how the costs were 
increasing on the blackboard.” (Doctor) 
 
The middle management simply asserts that everyone thinks that there were economic reasons 
behind but that the top management stated that this was not the case. Despite not having 
economical reasons as a purpose for the merger the top management does affirm that they hope 
and believe there will be positive economic benefits following the merger. It is also said that cost 
efficiency is included in care quality and that is the basis for maintaining a competitive power. 
 
“The entire Proluma process, and also the fusion process, has until today not had any 
demands for any economic conditions. But since we are in a position where we have a 
four-five hundred million deficit we realize we have to bring home the rationalizing 
effects that we can create.” (Top manager) 
 
5.2.2 Legitimacy issues  
The legitimacy issues that emerged have partly been mentioned. A strange picture of what the actual 
purpose was resulted in a lot of talk and intrigues. The purpose was perceived as shifting when 
questioned and the purpose was never fully explained satisfactory, even though the change to a 
large extent involved the possible destruction of existing and well functioning structures. Some 
doctors became suspicious of who the persons involved where and who was actually behind the 
decisions. When it comes to the placement of the eye clinic there was a lot of talk about whether the 
clinic had become an article of exchange in a bargain. In December 2007 a study suggested that the 
eye clinic in Malmö should be moved to Lund and there was an agreement on this (Region Skåne, 
2008h), but in the beginning of 2008 the decision was the opposite. Equal numbers of units should be 
moved to and from each of the two hospitals. Some doctors perceive the placement of the eye clinic 
in Malmö to have been a bargain either to make the number of units moved between the hospitals 
equal for them to maintain the prestige or that an influential division manager traded the eye clinic 
for the jaw surgery. Supposedly it was decided that the jaw surgery was to be moved from Lund to 
Malmö but that this was reversed for some unknown reason. The doctors mentioning this emphasise 
that they do not know whether this is true or not but it was a general conception shared by several 
doctors. One doctor describes how the management explained that the changes could not be 
optimal for all the clinics within the same division, as they were among the first ones to start this 
process. They were aware of the fact that it would be uncomfortable but it was necessary and the 
eye clinic would have to bear with this, for purposes of fairness. For the doctors this was very hard to 
understand since the eye clinic in Lund was so much bigger, and logically would be the clinic that 
could most easily accommodate the other clinic’s operations without major restructuring and 
disturbances. 
 
5.2.3 Identified advantages and disadvantages 
We have identified more specific reasons in addition to the official and most often mentioned 
purposes such as a concentration of competence, increased competitive power and quality as well as 
the much debated economic reasons. These could be both theoretical advantages, what ought to be 
good when merging two hospitals or two clinics, or what the actual sought after advantages in this 
particular merger was.  
 
In the governing document for the entire change program it is declared that the selected units will be 
merged with one management placed at one of the sites and that inpatient care and emergency care 
is to be focused to one of the sites, while a smaller part of the business can be located at the other 
site if special requirements can be indicated (Region Skåne, 2008c). These are some specific 
objectives that are also mentioned by the top management. The establishing of a more attractive 
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workplace, better coordination between the two hospitals as well as with the university and 
medicine faculty, and an achievement of a larger pool of patients in order to create a critical mass 
are also advantages mentioned. It is argued that concentrated competence can increase the chances 
of innovation and that expensive equipment, surgery rooms and administration can be better utilized 
in order to save money. It is also argued that the organisation is decentralised through the 
establishment of one line of managers, each being responsible for a hospital, division or clinic. It is 
said that this is to achieve decentralisation through centralisation in the sense that the clinical 
manager can make decisions regarding both of the geographically separated sites since they are 
managed as one clinic. In the same way the division and hospital management is unified into one, but 
with two geographical placements. To a large extent the middle managers mention the same 
advantages. The disadvantage mentioned by the management is primarily the geographical closeness 
to the patient, which is reduced.  
 
Aspects that are considered both an advantage and disadvantage is the competition between the 
two eye clinics. Both management and doctors recognize that there can be advantages with a 
healthy competition where one clinic spurs the other, as well as disadvantages where the 
competition can become destructive. However, some of the doctors and a middle manager indicate 
that some of this destructive rivalry was created by the actual merger process and that the rivalry 
that existed before the merger was not of a problematic magnitude. Another advantage mentioned 
by a middle manager, concerned with the non-acknowledgement of the size and complexity of eye 
health care, is that a bigger clinic might receive more importance, attention and thus influence. On 
the other hand a smaller organisation does not require the same amount of managers and is much 
easier to manage compared to a large one. Having the clinics and divisions at two geographically 
separated locations is also mentioned as a disadvantage by both the middle managers and doctors. 
 
The doctors think that the theoretical advantages could be a concentrated emergency duty, 
administration and the highly specialised competence, as well as avoiding sub-optimisation of 
specialities. The disadvantages they mention are that the clinic becomes too big and people do not 
know each other as well as before which impedes informal communication. They also think that this 
makes the managers more controlling, meddling with doctors’ affairs by making more detailed 
decisions regarding how the doctors should carry out their work. A doctor says that “of course you do 
not dare to delegate as much as if you knew everyone”. Yet a disadvantage mentioned by the doctors 
is that they can no longer change employer. If someone was unhappy or had a conflict with 
colleagues at one of the clinics he or she used to be able to change employer and work at the other 
clinic, without having to move further away. This is a reason to why some of the rivalry emerged 
between the two clinics. The merger forced these individuals to start working with each other again 
as well as arguing for why one or the other clinic should be moved, which caused a lot of destructive 
conflict. Out of a salary perspective it was also an advantage with two clinics since it was possible to 
change employer and thus renegotiate the salary. One doctor thinks this might have been one of the 
reasons why top management wanted to merge, too keep down salary escalation. In the end, three 
years after the merger the doctors are still unsure about the purpose and objectives of the merger.  
 
5.2.a Purpose of the merger – Discussion  
According to R. Axelsson (1998) it can be difficult to establish concrete and clear objectives in 
complex professional organisations. Within health care these are often unclear and controversial. 
There are common “parade goals” such as “health to everyone” that are so generally formulated that 
they hardly are of any value or guidance within the practical health care business. Beer, Eisenstat & 
Spector (1990) write that buzzwords become a substitute for a detailed understanding of the 
business. We would comment that the arguments of competitive power and competence 
concentration used by management might have become such parade purposes from the doctors’ 
point of view. The doctors did not feel like they received a convincing explanation of how these goals 
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would be achieved, instead they believed the merger would have the opposite outcome. Posnett, 
(2002) argues that the burden of proof must be with those who propose a concentration to quantify 
the expected benefits and costs and to explain these to the doctors. Furthermore he argues that the 
process by which benefits will be realized in practice must be equally explained as well.  
 
In our study the doctors and management shared several ideas of the theoretical advantages but the 
top management thought there were several more advantages that the other groups did not 
mention. The doctors and middle management on the other hand were to a larger extent taking the 
disadvantages into their considerations. According to Alarik (1982) this is not uncommon as 
advantages are usually exaggerated and favourable information is emphasised by management, 
while the corresponding problems are underestimated and neglected. When there are possible 
negative consequences identified by the management it is important that they are open with these. 
Ford, Ford & D’Amelio (2008) describe how communicating a representative view of the merger is 
important. If the chances of success or failure are not truthfully explained this might result in 
resistance from the employees. Hence, realistic previews help the employees with getting through a 
merger process when it comes to coping with uncertainty and adapt better to the possibility of 
dysfunctional outcomes (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991).  
 
Alarik (1982) describes how personal relationships are very important in a merger and that emotional 
factors affect the merger which is based more on mutual trust than on formal assessments of the 
opportunities. The doctors describe how they perceive their clinic to have been a bargain between 
influential managers where one did not want “his” jaw surgery to be transferred from Lund to 
Malmö. Presumably this was based on emotional factors and mutual trust between the influential 
managers instead, which led to the revocation of a decision that the doctors perceived as taken. 
Whether this is true or not is sadly not of great importance, the mere existence of this perception 
among the doctors can be detrimental for establishing trust in a change process. By failing to 
legitimize the change the change agent can in fact contribute to the occurrence of resistance (Ford, 
Ford & D’Amelio, 2008) due to the failure of establishing trustful relationships, which in the end 
might have a negative effect on the merger (Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2000). 
 
In conclusion, despite the fact that management and the doctors to a large extent agree on several of 
the theoretical advantages, it is mostly middle management and doctors who also consider the 
disadvantages of a merger. In order to avoid negative results it is the responsibility of those who 
advocate mergers to prove their case regarding the benefits of the envisaged merger (Canadian 
Health Services Research Foundation, 2004).  
 
We will now discuss the results of the merger and how its outcomes are perceived differently by the 
three different study groups. While the top management is positive about the results the doctors 
believe the envisaged disadvantages were fulfilled and the possible advantages unrealized.  
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5.3 Perceived results of the merger 
Due to the vertical diversity of our study the perceived results of the merger are influenced by the 
organisational positions of the participants. The top managers evaluate the merger more out of a 
perspective encompassing the entire hospital while doctors evaluate the merger from the 
perspective of their operational specialty. In between the merger is evaluated from a divisional or 
clinical perspective etc. The pattern is clear: the further up the individual is in the hierarchy the more 
positive he or she is while further down the organisation negative perceptions of the results are the 
most prevailing. 
 
The management believes that the merger has been successful. They mainly mention the improved 
possibility to coordinate between the two different hospitals as well as good results on a hospital 
level in terms of increased productivity, quality, budget surplus, cost control and other reforms. We 
asked whether the original goals with the merger were achieved:  
 
“Yes, we have delivered. And that is also the reason why I am here to begin with.” 
(Region Director) 
 
The reason as to why the merger continued from Proluma (merging fourteen initial clinics) to 
Proluma II, which was converted to the actual SUS merger where the entire hospitals were merged, 
was that the results were so good. Regarding the existence of negative results the top managers 
admit that the final results were good, albeit not without some problems. The main problem that still 
remains is the problem with coordinating the IT systems, which the top management attributes to 
the cultural differences that existed between the hospitals, where the hospitals had different 
routines and used different medical terms.   
 
The top managers say that there were no long-term negative consequences and that they do not 
know if any of the initial problems still remain. They assert that there were several clinics that 
“initially were a little problematic” but that these problems were corrected rather quickly. They also 
agree that there was some loss of competence but that they are about to re-hire new personnel and 
that, as mentioned above, the effects of the competence loss are not lasting.  
 
The middle managers are not as positive to the outcome. One is hesitantly positive and says that the 
merger probably was correct but that it depends on where you look. Some clinics have managed well 
but others have had very severe negative consequences. Another one mentions mainly negative 
consequences. One of them says that so far the patients have not been affected negatively but on 
the other hand it is still admitted that the severe competence loss is negative for the patients in the 
long run as they might not get access to the competence they might require. There have been cases 
where the fusion directly affects patients negatively; often in such a way that they have to travel to 
Stockholm or Örebro to receive treatment that they can no longer receive in either Lund or Malmö, 
and that this brings about risks of deteriorating health status (Skånska Dagbladet, 2011).  
 
Among the doctors the negative perceptions on the results are overwhelming. All the doctors said 
that the objectives have not been achieved at all, rather the opposite. Some of them mention that it 
might become better for resident doctors who are still learning since they can visit both the clinics 
and see a broader spectrum of patients; but this is also the only positive consequence that we have 
been able to identify. Many of the doctors bluntly answered “no” to the question whether there 
were any positive outcomes. As discussed above most of the doctors agree on the theoretical 
advantages that might occur, but they do not believe that these have been realized. Instead they 
argue that the result is the opposite of what was envisaged with a loss of competence as well as 
worsened organisation, economy and competitive power. Below we will discuss these different 
consequences separately. 
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5.3.1 Competence loss 
The competence loss is the most frequently mentioned negative consequence by all the interview 
participants. But it is not seen as something that has severely damaged the operational work at the 
clinics. The top managers mean that the lost competence has been partly replaced by new recruits. 
 
“No, it has not had any lasting consequences. We have lost doctors, we have lost 
personnel. But on the units where we lost personnel we are about to re-hire. (...). We 
have mainly lost doctors but even other personnel. It is also so that some have realized 
that it was not greener on the other side and have come back.” (Top Manager) 
 
“So it is the same doctors that left who are coming back?” (Interviewer) 
 
“Nah, not really, not by a long shot. But there are those who probably thought that it 
was greener in other places and later realize that interesting things are happening here 
and that maybe they should participate in that.” (Top Manager) 
 
When asking a doctor we were told that those who left had not returned and that the newly 
recruited doctors certainly were good and competent doctors but did not have the 10-30 years of 
specialized experience as those who left. And in numbers they were not close to fill up all the empty 
positions. The managers explain the competence losses as mainly due to the rivalry between the 
clinics:  
 
“There were some key persons within eye surgery, for example, that in indignation or 
despair over our decision... well... if you want to banter a little: there were some who 
absolutely would not consider to, if you live in Lund, go to Malmö and work, and not 
cooperate with the corresponding clinic either.” (Top Manager) 
 
“There has been some kind of antagonism between them where one has looked down 
upon the university part in Malmö as well. Lund University is just as big in Malmö as in 
Lund when it comes to the hospital point of view. That aspect was a little frightening I 
think, it also led to, in some areas, a competence loss, mainly within the eye surgery.” 
(Top Manager) 
 
According to the top managers the competence loss is not necessarily negative either: 
 
“We do not have the full picture *of how many have left+. We have not said that it is 
what is important. Instead the important thing is the results that we achieve through 
these changes that we are doing. Then you know that in all of these changes there is 
bound to be some turbulence. And some do not like that. And sometimes it is actually 
good that those who do not like this do not stay, from the perspective of the operational 
core, because they have another attitude and are probably a better fit for another 
organisation. And others should come to us instead because it suits them better. So you 
must have some respect for this, everyone cannot be equal and everyone cannot 
participate.” (Top Manager) 
 
The middle management thinks that the competence losses are more severe and say that it is a 
critical issue when competent colleagues who maintain the operational core business are lost. 
Especially since this forces the clinic to pass on patients for whom the clinic is supposed to be “the 
final destination” of referral.   
 
The doctors consider the competence loss very damaging for the clinic. One doctor describes how 
they used to be 33 doctors in Lund and 23 or 24 in Malmö, almost as many as 60 in total, and that 
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they now are 40 in total. They say that 18 doctors have left or are about to leave, since we were told 
that two were leaving during our study. Moreover, after the Proluma process and before the SUS 
merger, there used to be four retina surgeons in Malmö and one in Lund but the two who are leaving 
are both senior doctors from Malmö. There are now, ex-post, two junior and one senior doctors 
remaining, one doctor says. But the remaining senior doctor is placed in Lund while the two junior 
doctors are placed in Malmö. There used to be four seniors in Lund and two seniors plus one junior in 
Malmö prior to Proluma. (Note: what we refer to here as a junior doctor is what our interviewees 
refer to as a doctor who is not entirely independent. Considering the highly specialized care these 
surgeons need approximately 10 years of experience before being considered independent, 
according to one interviewee.) After Proluma and the numerous voluntary resignations one of the 
most experienced doctors with over 30 years of experience, referred to as “one of the top three in 
the country”, was recruited. But during our study we were told that he resigned in frustration during 
what is referred to as the aftermath of the merger and its residual problems.  
 
A middle manager says that while the junior doctors might consider it a challenge to be part of this 
kind of process, the senior and most competent doctors may not feel like they want to “sacrifice 
[their] last years on this”. The doctors think that this is extra critical to the future of the eye clinic 
since newly recruited doctors cannot profit from their unique and exclusive knowledge and 
competence. They describe how a doctor with 20 years of experience still has a lot to learn from 
those with 30 years of experience. Thus the knowledge transfer will, according to the doctors, have 
long-term effects that are not going to be replaced until after 10-20 years when the existing doctors 
have accumulated the corresponding experience. Especially since the doctors are so highly 
specialized and there might be only one to five doctors within some specialities.  
 
Some of the doctors who left did not do this directly because of the merger. But when so many 
doctors left there were a lot of senior doctor positions available that were filled by junior doctors. 
This is the only time when you can raise your salary except the annually fixed salary increases. The 
quick depletion caused the salary escalation among doctors much younger than the other senior 
doctors. Suddenly the younger doctors earned 10 000 to 20 000 SEK more per month than the older 
seniors who still continually taught them, helped them and transferred their knowledge down. Thus 
some of the older seniors got frustrated and felt like they were treated unfairly and left.  
 
The competence loss was also in terms of nurses. The established inpatient ward in Lund had nurses 
with several years of specialized experience. When moving the inpatient care to Malmö these were 
not brought and instead the new ward unit is shared with plastic surgery, the otorhinology (ears, 
nose and throat) clinic and the breast cancer clinic. In Malmö there is now only one nurse with eye 
care experience, the others do not have specialized eye education or experience and can thus not do 
the same kind of effective work, instead having to transfer more of the work back up to the doctors.  
 
The same problem exists with on-call duty. Some queries used to be taken care of by nurses directly, 
but now most calls are transferred to the on-call doctors immediately. During the night the on-call 
duty doctors used to be woken up once every fourth nights but now they are woken up four to five 
times each night since there are no longer any nurses who can take care of these inquiries. One 
doctor also mentions the loss of secretaries due to management’s idea to reduce the secretaries 
from “if it was from 1.8 to 1.6 secretaries per doctor, I do not remember, but it was something like 
that” and that this resulted in an increased work load for the remaining secretaries. As a 
consequence, some quit due to the worsened work climate, which further increased the work-load of 
remaining secretaries as well as doctors in a kind of vicious circle.  
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5.3.2 Organisation 
The organisational results mentioned by the top management referred mostly to successfully 
organising the hospital governing functions and the divisional structure. They also mention their idea 
of dealing with the initial cultural problems. They did not aim to unite the two cultures but instead to 
create a new one and they say that they were successful in doing this. 
 
The middle management makes comparisons to other clinics and say that those that were 
successfully concentrated to one area have achieved good results but there are several examples 
where this has not happened and those clinics have had problems as well, the most severe of which 
is the eye clinic. Middle management describes the current work as repairing and “trying to save the 
operational core business”. The problem is that the operational work has been divided 
geographically, the capacity has been reduced and the organisational fit and structure has been 
destroyed.  
 
The doctors describe the same things and bring up several different issues. In Lund they used to have 
12-16 inpatient ward beds with specialized eye nurses while in Malmö they had 4 beds that were 
shared with plastic surgery and hand surgery. The reason to why Lund had so many more beds was 
that they had the largest retinal surgery which has a higher demand for inpatient beds. The idea of 
the top management was to reduce the inpatient beds and concentrate them to Malmö. They said 
that the eye clinic in Malmö would have five guaranteed beds (also mentioned in a document: Region 
Skåne, 2008d) but when they noticed this was not enough it was extended to eight, shared with 
plastic surgery, the otorhinology clinic and the breast cancer clinic. However, they noticed that this 
was not enough so they are now sharing four beds with ear surgery in Lund as well. In total they have 
fewer beds that are now shared with other specialities where the nurses have no knowledge of eye 
care and they are spread on more geographically separated locations in a “confusing” and “weird” 
manner. When closing down the existing inpatient ward unit in Lund in Malmö it was not simply 
spread on different locations in Malmö but it also forced the existing structure in the Malmö clinic to 
be broken up and spread around in order to accommodate the Lund operations. In the shared ward 
units the fit between eye care and the other specialities is also not optimal. The eye care patients 
come and go much more frequently since they only have to stay a day or two while the other 
patients stay for several days. The turnover of eye patients is higher which disturbs the routines of 
the other specialties. Overall the capacity has been greatly reduced, says a doctor.  
 
The result is that patients sometimes have been sent in taxi between the two hospitals or been 
referred back and forth to get some treatment at each site. The same goes for surgery. Instead of 
being spread on two surgery rooms they are now spread on three that are shared with other clinics. 
The reason to this was simply that there was not enough space in Malmö when moving there.  
 
The on call duty was also merged. From having two on-call duties, one in each city, these are now 
reduced to one. The combination of having twice as many patients but reduced number of educated 
nurses has negative effects on maintaining an effective on-call duty. Previously the nurses could take 
care of night time issues but now they have to call and wake up the doctors much more often as 
explained above. This will also be commented upon in the following chapter on efficiencies.  
 
Other issues such as communication and relational aspects have suffered negative consequences 
according to the doctors. Instead of having the eye clinic manager close at hand at all times he now 
has to travel between the two sites since they are merged into one clinic with one management. 
Existing informal relationship such as who to talk to and rely on has been broken. The same goes for 
inter-specialty networks where the eye clinic cooperated with other clinics on multi-trauma patients. 
 
In total the number of visits with a doctor or nurses has been reduced from 90 000 a year to 50 000 a 
year according to a middle manager. In addition to the loss of visits due to the competence loss of 
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doctors and nurses this is also, according to a doctor, explained by the need for doctors to travel 
between Malmö and Lund for weekly meetings. After the merger the doctors have to go to Malmö or 
Lund every second week which requires half a day instead of an hour at the end of the day.  The 
doctor says that the hourly loss each week corresponds to 5 000 patient consultations each year. 
 
In the future the doctors, from both the Malmö and Lund site, believe that the management will 
realise that it is not sustainable the way it is organised now. They say that the clinic is completely 
drained and ruined; they will have to build a new common building. If this is done then eventually 
the clinic might build up sufficient competence and hire enough doctors, nurses and secretaries, 
create a good education situation and connections to research. “But I do not think it will exist much 
earlier than in ten years from now.” Others are not so optimistic but say ten to twenty years. 
However, we also note that at the moment of writing, there are plans to demolish all eye clinic 
buildings and centralise to one location, starting as early as next year (Skånska dagbladet, 2011b). 
This could satisfy some of the problems.  
 
5.3.3 Economy 
The merger did not, officially, have any financial purpose; at least not as it was later revised after the 
first Proluma announcement. On the other hand the competitive power was envisaged as the main 
objective; the competition for patients and thus income. Other regions voiced concern about the 
outcome of the initial Proluma merger and what the results would be since they wanted to know if it 
would remain safe for the patients to keep sending them to Lund or not (Region Skåne, 2008b) and 
the previous Lund clinical manager argued that the temporary effectiveness decrease would make 
the other regions negotiate agreements to send their patients to other clinics in Sweden or Denmark 
which would have permanent effects (Region Skåne, 2008a). In the end the result is that the eye 
clinic sometimes has to pass on patients to other regions even though the eye clinic in either Lund or 
Malmö used to be the final destination for these cases. There are cases where the patients have 
been exposed to big risks due to this (Skånska Dagbladet, 2011a).  
 
“Before the merger Lund had patients coming from almost all clinics in the south of 
Sweden, retinal and corneal cases. Almost all of these disappeared after the merger. 
Patients are being referred to other Swedish clinics instead. This is due to our lack of 
surgeons and beds. One argument for the merger was that the joint clinic was going to 
be more competitive in comparison to the Copenhagen clinics and other big clinics in 
Sweden. This has not been the case. On the contrary we are now less competitive.” 
(Doctor) 
 
Other regions, such as Halland, Gotland, and Kronoberg, are no longer sending some of their eye 
patients to Lund because they have no confidence in what remains of the eye health care. There is a 
lot of income from other regions in this health care that is lost. There is also a lot of money lost in 
sending the patients between the two different hospitals due to lack of capacity and ability to do 
some specialized treatments at one of the hospitals. Mostly the patient’s have to pay the travel by 
themselves, but sometimes the hospital has to pay transportation service or even taxis, which is 
something that several of the doctors mention. When the doctors have to travel between the 
hospitals this is of course something that the hospital has to pay for as well. According to a doctor 
the actual physical move between the two hospitals was also very expensive, especially since the lack 
of planning called for several temporary solutions that later had to be re-adjusted. 
 
Further costs are increased due to worsened treatment as well as the impaired possibility to 
diagnose and treat the patients completely during one visit. More unnecessary patient visits mean 
higher costs according to the doctors. There is also the on-call duty. We have described how the 
doctors are contacted and woken up much more often. When this happens they receive twice the 
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normal pay, or two times the on-call compensatory leave, instead of the low on call duty wage. Not 
to mention that the doctor’s salary is much higher than a nurse’s to begin with and that the previous 
nurses could cover these inquiries during their regular night working hours. Thus, as one doctor 
describes it, they have saved money by closing the on call duty in Lund but on the other hand those 
who are now working in Malmö has twice as much to do and they receive higher compensation.  
 
“I do not think that they save that much money on it. But they are probably imagining 
themselves that they do.” (Doctor) 
 
A possibility for this is that the difference is lost in the accounts, meaning the on-call compensation 
to doctors is paid out of another account than the salaries of previous night shift nurses, concealing 
the imbalance. 
 
5.3.a Perceived results of the merger – Discussion  
In merger theory there is strong empirical evidence of mergers having the negative impact that 
scholars have suggested (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991). But considering the increased pace of recent 
organisational changes in health care there is surprisingly little attention being paid to organisational 
research (Aiken et al, 1997 in Aiken & Sloane, 2002). In many instances organisational reengineering 
has led to worsened cost competitiveness for hospitals, compared to other hospitals in their vicinity 
(Walston, Burns, & Kimberly, 2000) which often can be explained by opposition, especially from 
health care professionals who work independently and autonomously (Redfern & Christian, 2003). 
Little is known about how many of the organisational changes actually affect the patient and the 
outcome of treatments (Marmor, 1998; Leatt et al., 1997 in Aiken & Sloane, 2002). Much more 
information is required to understand the processes that drive good outcome. On-going training, 
teamwork, adherence to evidence-based protocols and appropriate support services are important 
factors that should not be overlooked (Posnett, 2002).  
 
In general, different interventions seem to be blunt tools to achieve change. Especially organisational 
interventions seem to be as likely to prevent access to efficient interventions as to efficient ones 
(Freemantle, 2002). Considering the need for change that exist in many organisations (see Palmer, 
Dunford & Akin, 2009) our interpretation of this is that either the wrong hospital organisational 
changes are effected, or they are carried out in inappropriate ways. Aiken & Sloane (2002) seem to 
share this belief claiming that organisation and culture are factors that are not appreciated enough in 
explaining hospital outcomes. They continue by arguing that a better understanding  of how clinical 
care is influenced by these factors is key to preserving hospitals’ favourable influence on patient 
outcomes as well as reducing unnecessary costs where this is actually needed.  
 
In studied countries, such as Canada, Denmark, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom, 
the negative consequences following hospital reorganisation has been professional and public 
discontent where unsafe professional staffing levels and eroding quality of care have been cited 
(Aiken & Sloane, 2002).  
 
In our study there are no statements of patient outcomes being directly affected negatively. 
However, the total production has been greatly reduced which decreases the patient’s access to 
appointments and treatments; competence loss impairs the access to the most qualified doctor; and 
as discussed above, in ‘How to measure effectiveness,’ there are patient groups who are not 
receiving their treatment in time due to the financial system. However, these factors are more in 
relation to capacity, ability and prioritizing and not specifically organising. 
 
But there is some research relating patient outcomes to organisation or the effects of organisational 
changes. After studying an abundance of research Aiken & Sloane (2002) conclude that there are 
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indications that nurse staffing and skill mix are important determinants of patient outcomes. Their 
own research showed that independently of the individual skills and number of nurses there are also 
signs of patient outcomes being affected by how the nursing care is organised. They found that 
dissatisfaction and burnout among nurses is directly correlated to patient dissatisfaction and quality 
of care. Pearson et al. (2006) have also found that greater proportions of regulated staff and 
registered nurse hours are associated with improved patient outcomes and that this should be kept 
in mind when determining the level of staffing and workload which is directly related to voluntary 
resignations and emerging nurse shortages (Davidson et al., 1997). 
 
When relating this to the SUS merger we see that spreading the ward units on different locations, 
replacing specialized nurses with nurses who are also serving other specialties with different 
routines, and increasing their workload, might have negative effects on the patient outcomes. This 
has been observed in some processes where care has been disrupted, dissatisfaction increased and 
turn-over of personnel increases, which leads to personnel shortages.   
 
One of the arguments for the merger was to increase the quality of the care. According to Posnett 
(2002) the determinants of patient outcome are poorly understood and the emphasis on volume as 
an alternative for the skill and experience of individual doctors on clinical level is likely to be 
misplaced. Consequently, in the SUS merger it might be hard to justify losing some of the most 
experienced doctors in Sweden within their fields. Affording to lose 18 out of almost 60 doctors, 
some of which are among the only 25-30 specialists in Sweden, might not be compensated with the 
synergies envisaged from merging two clinics, especially not when these remain at two different 
sites. Posnett (2002) continues with arguing that the optimal scale of an emergency care hospital is 
dependent on networks and interpersonal relationships between specialties within the hospital. 
According to the eye clinic doctors these have partly been broken or threatened.  
 
The effects of losing personnel are discussed in turnover research. There are several negative aspects 
of personnel turnover such as selection and recruitment costs, training and development costs, 
operational disruption and demoralization of membership (Staw, 1980). Turnover is, however, 
twofold, and the conventional assumption that low turnover is preferred is not always true 
(Glebbeek & Bax, 2004). Instead it should be seen as a contingent phenomenon where the 
organisational conditions determine whether employee turnover is beneficial or not (Ton & 
Huckman, 2008).  
 
Considering the amount of skills, experience and specialization needed within professions in the form 
of on-the-job training and indoctrination (Mintzberg, 1993) and the testimonies of our interviewees 
we cannot identify that any of the positive consequences from turnover mentioned by for example 
Staw (1980) are generally contingent to hospitals and the doctor profession. At the same time it is a 
plausible assumption that hospitals and the doctor profession generally are characterized by a low 
employee turnover; at least this was the case in our study of the eye clinic where several doctors 
have spent practically their entire careers at the same work place. Settings that require high levels of 
knowledge, which is certainly true in the case hospital personnel and specialist doctors in particular, 
are generally affected negatively by high employee turnover. Ton & Huckman (2008) confirmed that 
firms with a low turnover suffer larger negative effects on performance from the loss of an employee 
since this employee leaves with substantial experience. The corresponding effect is also true where 
firms with high turnover do not have the same negative impact on performance due to lower levels 
of accumulated experience being lost.  
 
Eventually the competence loss affects the competitiveness and consequently the economy in other 
ways than the negative aspects mentioned by Staw (1980). The loss of patients due to interregional 
health care competition is a cost over which the domestic region has very limited control (Hallin & 
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Siverbo, 2003). This is clear in the case of the eye clinic merger where other regions no longer dare to 
send their patient’s to Lund but send them elsewhere instead.  
 
The discussion above is a reflection on how the doctors and management perceive the results of the 
merger. According to them this might be just another example of the failed hospital fusions 
described in merger literature (Jordan & Stuart, 2000; Weil, 2010). A final remark on the result of the 
Proluma and SUS merger is that one of the most important reasons to why the expected advantages 
of size do not appear in horizontal mergers can be derived to imperfections in the fundamental 
business idea (Alarik, 1982). We will now continue by discussing the process of the merger and how 
management and doctors perceive the events that led to their respective perceptions of the results 
described here.  
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5.4 The managing of the merger process 
We have discussed the envisaged purpose, objectives and perceived advantages and disadvantages. 
Furthermore, we have discussed the existing differences in how the results of the merger are 
perceived by the different actors. We will now discuss how this gap might have emerged by 
describing how the merger was managed and how the doctors responded to this; because the way in 
which a transformation is managed seems to be a key to successful organisational change. 
 
“In a national sample of hospitals, reengineering alone was not found to improve the 
relative cost-competitive position. Organizations attempting to improve their cost 
competitiveness must consider the way in which change is implemented.” (Walston, 
Burns & Kimberly, 2000) 
 
To this end, we will here discuss the managerial perspectives on the use of theories, management’s 
apparent focus on the top of the organisation, operational staff’s voice and opportunity to contribute 
to the process, possible explanations to the problems encountered and the view that the approach 
to change was perceived as unrealistic and contradictory. 
 
5.4.1 Managerial perspectives on the use of theories 
We asked the top managers whether they had used any experience or inspiration from other major 
hospital mergers or theories and theoretical frameworks. We also asked the doctors and middle 
managers if they had noticed the use of such elements by the top managers. One top manager 
mentions several different business development theories that he has seen during his years as a 
manager, including Total Production Systems, TQM, Six Sigma et cetera. The manager claims to “have 
seen all of these letter combinations” (Top Manager). Other literature mentioned by the same 
manager is about intellectual capital, leadership and Lean. Overall the top management shows a lack 
of confidence in the practical usefulness of theoretical literature. One mentions that he has a kind of 
“allergic reaction” to them because they are too theoretical and they come and go with the same 
“prophets” proclaiming the necessity of this new “letter combination”. Instead, they would describe 
themselves as rather pragmatic. They have “followed the development in the surrounding world” and 
at least tried to learn from what was done in Stockholm and Göteborg, where one of the managers 
says there were several problems. But all the top managers claim that it is mostly their own vast 
experience, gained during their careers, that has been used. 
 
During the discussions following the announcement of Proluma the doctors said that there will be 
competence losses. According to one of the doctors a top manager’s response to this was: “that is 
what everyone always says and it is just empty talk” (Top Manager). Basically there is only one 
change management conception used by the absolute top management of the merger. Regarding if 
there was any use of theories the initiator of the merger process answered: 
 
”Well, not really from my side. Except the general principle that it should be done 
relatively quickly. It should be rather clear and simple information when carrying through 
such huge changes. The more academic you make the information the more painful it 
becomes in a way.” (Region Director) 
 
He is aware of the existence of theories and research that propose that classical merger strategies 
are unsuccessful and that an incremental, emergent, bottom-up approach seems to be a better 
merger management strategy, but he does not agree with them.  
 
”There are those who disagree. There is a researcher and consultant at Lund University 
(…) who usually writes debate articles saying that we have done everything wrong. (…).  
I do not agree with her on the conclusions she gets from literature and so on regarding 
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that no fusions succeed if they are speedy, but rather that there should be a slow and 
tenacious process. I have another opinion and I know many others who have another 
opinion of this as well.” (Region Director) 
 
Instead the speed in the process is seen as a way of showing decency towards the personnel:  
 
”There are few among us humans who love change, or being subjected to change. We 
want to decide alone when we are subjected to it and how that change will look. It is 
very human. And therefore it is very important to be very clear and very quick, in such a 
process, with what is happening so there are not several other pictures spreading that 
you have to spend a lot of time to try and handle. So I think it is a process of decency in 
all contexts. The personnel should not have to read these things in the papers but should 
get the information directly.” (Region Director) 
 
However, all other interview subjects voiced opinions about the merger being done too quickly. This 
was brought up by doctors and middle managers alike and even among top managers on lower 
positions. One doctor says that health care organisations should be characterized by slow 
transformations and certain levels of inflexibility in order to ensure patient security in the same way 
that hospitals do not adopt new treatment programs on regular patients until they have been 
thoroughly tested and approved. Changing the health care too quickly could result in drastic 
impairments that could not be foreseen. We mentioned that others in the organisation had voiced 
concern about how little time six weeks are in order to merge a hospital of this magnitude, and asked 
the initiator for comments on this.  
 
”No. For the operating core it was not too short, absolutely not, on the contrary. I mean, 
the hospital manager was informed and he had already considered how to rig the 
management organisation et cetera so it did not come as a bomb to him on the 23-24 
November. Then you can always discuss whether the political process was too quick or 
not, that is something I leave to the politicians. From the perspective of the business, 
from the employees, from an effectiveness perspective, there was nothing to complain 
about with the speed.” (Region Director) 
 
Both among doctors and middle management voices are raised about the lack of using theory: 
 
“My theory is that they have not used any theory.” (Middle Manager) 
 
5.4.1.a Managerial perspectives on the use of theories – Discussion  
The top management shows a clear mistrust of academia in general when it comes to content and 
application of theories. They describe the use of theories in a similar way to that often discussed in 
management fashion literature, where the emergence and disappearance of 'new' organisation 
concepts are a popular topic (Bender & van Veen, 2001). A management fashion can be defined as a 
relatively transitory collective belief, disseminated by management fashion setters (Abrahams, 1996). 
The imprudent following of such fads and fashions can be potentially harmful to an organisation and 
might cause organisations to leap rapidly from one technology to the next, so that no technology has 
enough time to work (Abrahams, 1991). These fads and fashions can be the result of a group of 
organisations’ high uncertainty regarding goals and the efficiency of innovations. They are likely to 
emerge due to outside organisations’ high, sometimes coercive, influence. Examples of such outside 
organisations are governmental regulators or labour unions. On the contrary the fads and fashions 
can also emerge due to limited influence from outside groups or organisations. This can cause 
organisations to adopt technically inefficient innovations or to reject efficient ones; it can also cause 
them to imitate each other's unwise adoption or rejection of such innovations (Abrahams, 1991). 
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In Swedish health care there has been an ambition to find a “final solution” to all the possible 
problems that the previous organisational and administrative structures have had, and not been able 
to solve. This has resulted in a lot of uniform organisational changes during the last few decades that 
have been affected by administrative fashion and political ambitions (R. Axelsson, 1998). Hence, the 
risk for the emergence of change fatigue and inoculation, as discussed by Palmer et al. (2009) and 
Ford, Ford & D’Amelio (2008), is apparent in the health care sector. Hallin & Siverbo (2003) write that 
there are no longer any self-evident ideals for the organising of the Swedish health care. It used to be 
dominated by different ideas but is now characterized by diminished confidence for both 
organisational ideas and organisational reforms. Derisive terms are commonly used to paint a sharp 
contrast between 'following fashions' and what serious and rational managers are supposed to do 
(Bender & van Veen, 2001).  
 
In our case the top managers are averse to popular management theories proclaimed by 
management “prophets” and prefer to see themselves as pragmatics. In accordance with 
management fashion literature this is not surprising and it could also be seen as a wise basis not to 
jump on fashion after fashion. This view is shared by doctors, exemplified by Olsson (2005) who in a 
debate article asks when common sense will become a fashion word within health care. In Sweden 
many of the reforms are derived from New public management (NPM) where different models have 
succeeded each other and there has been a clear element of fashion where regions and counties 
imitate each other (Elmqvist, 2002).  
 
However, the top management’s emphasis on following the development in the surrounding world 
indicates that they have looked at what is so common today: mergers. According to Choi (2011) there 
is no doubt that mergers have permeated all sectors of society leading to a merger mania in the 
world that reached the Swedish health care sector in the 1990s. Ahgren (2008) writes that the 
Swedish hospital mergers seem to stem from a conviction among policy makers that bigger hospitals 
lead to lower average costs and improved clinical outcomes. He writes that the effects of these 
mergers have not been systematically evaluated. The question is whether it is automatically better to 
be big. On the SUS “about us” web page the first sentence describing SUS is that it is the third largest 
university hospital in Sweden (Region Skåne, 2011). This might be an indication of what is valued.  
 
The problem emerges as the mistrust of theories causes management to disregard the studied 
common outcomes of organisational changes that are discussed in change management literature 
(Kanter et al., 1992; Palmer et al., 2009). No real theory is considered except a principle of doing it 
quick, a strategy that research has shown to be controversial at best. Some studies show that speed 
is good (Jordan & Stuart, 2000) while others indicate that haste does not lead to successful and 
sustainable organisational change (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). The top management is influenced by 
other mergers but neglects studied outcomes of such mergers by asserting that arguments of 
competence loss is just “empty talk” when there is strong empirical evidence of mergers having the 
negative impact that scholars have suggested (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991). Thus our study supports 
the findings by Berggren & Silfverschiöld (2010) who studied the theoretical backgrounds for the SUS 
merger. They concluded that there are several indications of insufficient measurements being taken 
in order to avoid common merger and post-merger problems, something that decreases the chances 
for a positive outcome. 
 
5.4.2 Focus on the top of the organisation 
The merger was a strict top-down process which was a conscious strategy from top management. 
The decision was kept in a “tight and quick process” in order to “own the information to the affected 
employees” (Top Manager) and to avoid this information leaking out to the media. For that reason 
top management says that they informed neither the media nor the union until they informed the 
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personnel about their decision. The characteristic perspective held by the management can be 
illustrated with the words of one of the top managers:  
 
“I mean, *the hospital manager+ was informed and he had already considered how to rig 
the management organisation.” (Top Manager) 
 
 The speed of the process is mostly referring to organising the top of the hierarchy. The emphasis is 
put on which top manager is supposed to be at which position. The explanation is that it is important 
for everyone to know who to communicate with and to know who ones superior is to facilitate 
communication. It seems to be what has been most important and also the basis for how the success 
of the merger has been evaluated.   
 
”What we have succeeded with is to create a governing function. That is, we have 
created a governing structure around this, coordinated the different managers in this 
way. We have done that. And we have created an organisation for the business where 
we have divisions encompassing several of the hospital clinics.” (Top manager) 
 
However, the middle management thought that the focus was primarily on the administrative level 
and that there was insufficient focus on the organisation below the top layer of the hierarchy. Middle 
management thought that the spatial aspect was forgotten, the analysing was not completed and the 
possible final effects were not considered. This was criticized by several of the doctors who also 
mentioned that no planning was done regarding the required competence. The nurses with several 
years of experience from specialized eye care were eventually not brought to the inpatient ward unit. 
Middle management thought that the mental picture was ok but also that the “solution phase” was 
not detailed enough. The result was that parts of the business had no way to go when shutting down 
the inpatient ward unit at one of the two sites. Two weeks before closing down at Lund it was not 
decided where to move. And when it was decided to move into a shared ward unit with plastic 
surgery, the ears-nose-and-throat clinic and the breast cancer clinic, they were told that there was no 
room. 
 
 “But then a ‘strong man’ came in and said: ‘Now it is like this. They are moving in here 
now, do you understand?’” (Middle Manager) 
 
One doctor mentions how the opinions voiced by some of the elder professors on the changes of the 
business were belittled by top management. According to the doctor the reply to the professors’ 
opinions was: “professors do not know anything about organisation” Another doctor mentions that 
when the doctors were protesting against the decision the reply was that “if you make any trouble 
now you will only be punished for it later”. The doctor says that silence was what it was all about and 
that it probably was the worst reply they could have received. Another doctor says that when they 
informed the management about all the disadvantages and risks, that these changes would do more 
harm than good, they were not believed and management saw it as a lack of change potential among 
the employees. They were told that they were resistant to change. Since those at the bigger, and 
more developed, clinic in Lund were those who voiced the biggest concern in the beginning of the 
process it was seen as resistance due to rivalry. Those in Malmö who voiced their concerns about the 
problems were not as many in the beginning of the process as they realized the problems first later 
on.  
 
Among the top management there are those who believe that the organisation should be as 
decentralized as possible and that there are few strategic decisions that should be made by the 
hospital management alone. However, the fusion work, which is described as “laying a puzzle with 
rooms and other things”, must be all-embracing on hospital management level due to the internal 
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rivalry between the middle managers. We asked a middle manager whether he thought something 
should have been done differently in the process. 
 
 “Well… yes I probably think that… I mean, it was a top-down process from the region 
management, which possibly involved the hospital management. It should have gone 
down at least one more level in the organisation, in the planning process”.  
(Middle Manager) 
 
“We were practically only imposed to do things. So we have not really prepared such a 
process ourselves. We have not had the mission to prepare it but we have been the ones 
who carry it through. That is how it is. Of course, if we had had the task, Malmö and 
Lund, to do it in a certain way, with a time plan, then of course it might have been done 
in another way. Now it was practically from one day to another, it was a really quick 
process. There was not really any time for any coordination processes or such things. One 
should also do these risk- and consequence analyses as well, when moving things, 
according to those rules we have considering the union and such. We have not really, 
and the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare have indicated this, that we have 
not really always managed to keep up with those areas, and that is something that we 
have also been criticized for.” (Middle Manager) 
 
The top-down approach used included instructions that came from above the hospital manager. They 
were to involve everyone “straight across the lines” and in the instructions it was already decided 
which units were going to be merged, according to one of the top managers within the hospital.  
 
In an official document on the Proluma web page from March 19, 2008 (Region Skåne, 2008e) it is 
written that the hospital managers received instructions to leave suggestions for the coordination of 
the two hospitals. It further says that the following 14 business areas are by the hospital managers 
specified to be included in the first round and it is also indicated where the primary localisation of 
each business area should be, either in Malmö or in Lund. For the eye clinic it is indicated Malmö. 
Further down the document it says what should be done, including task descriptions and analysis. In 
the governing document for the change work (Region Skåne, 2008c) it is also declared that the 
selected units will be merged with one management placed at one of the sites and that long-term 
care and on-call duty is to be focused to one of the sites while a smaller part of the business can be 
located at the other site if special requirements can be indicated. The documents suggest that it was 
first decided which units that were to be merged and where they should be localised. The further 
analysis was to be conducted afterwards. The doctors think that the management should have 
looked to what the two different clinics were doing, what they were good at, what could have been 
done better and then tried to make the best out of it instead of, as they see it, arbitrarily appoint 
locations.  
 
5.4.2.a Focus on the top of the organisation – Discussion  
In the Proluma process it seems like important governing details regarding the eye clinic were 
decided by top management before a thorough consequence analysis involving eye clinic personnel 
was done, and in direct opposition to a previous investigation.  Thus there seems to be an 
exaggerated belief among the decision-makers in their own competence to make educated and fool-
proof decisions without the involvement of those with expert knowledge and vast experience from 
working within the affected business. The problem with decision-making in complex situations, such 
as an organisational transformation involving 12 500 employees and affecting 1.7 million inhabitants, 
is that it is impossible to acquire perfect information about the situation and all possible outcomes 
and effects. According to Beer, Eisenstat & Spector (1990) it is too risky as a deliberate strategy to 
start change exclusively from the top, even if it is possible. They write that change is about learning 
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and that it is a rare CEO who knows in advance the fine-grained details of organisational change that 
the many diverse units of a large corporation demand. A contributing factor to why so many 
horizontal mergers rarely are successful is because the decision process naturally is characterized by 
bounded rationality (Alarik, 1982).  
 
The previously discussed disbelief in contemporary merger and change management literature is 
probably a cause to what has been experienced as a lack of planning in the merger process. Another 
cause might be the focus on the upper layer of the organisation and the disregard of the lower 
layers, the ground floor where the actual business takes place. According to Choi (2011) 
management at all levels is important for the development and outcome of the merger process. In 
what Alarik (1982) describes as the coalition process the first aspects that need to be decided when 
taking the formal merger decision is to agree upon the owner questions, resource distribution and 
how the top layer of the organisation is to be designed. The problems concerning the actual 
coordination and the more detailed design are to a large extent transferred to someone else. In the 
case of the Proluma/SUS merger, however, it seems like the planning process has stopped at that 
level and that the rest of the process to a much larger extent is guided solely by the speed principle. 
This principle is both advocated (Jordan & Stuart, 2000) and impugned, at least if implemented in 
large-scale and simultaneously across the organisation, since it might hinder the establishment of 
trustful relationships and invoke resistance (Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2004). 
 
The use of a rapid progression of change programs is according to Beer, Eisenstat & Spector (1990) 
often a result of senior managers wanting to try another change program after previous ones have 
failed. The problem is that it only exacerbates the problem because they are designed to cover 
everyone and everything but end up covering nobody and nothing particularly well. There are 
indications that this might have happened in the SUS merger where the speed was priority and the 
top management says that the instructions went out “straight across the line”. Beer, Eisenstat & 
Spector (1990) proceed by stating that one-size-fits-all change programs causes general managers to 
not support them even when they acknowledge that their underlying principles may be useful. When 
Proluma was announced it was practically already decided which clinics that were going to be 
merged and where their principal placement with inpatient beds and emergency duty would be 
located (Region Skåne, 2008c). This can be seen as a one-size-fits-all solution considering that the 
clinics were simply split fifty-fifty between the two hospitals without preceding careful investigations 
and evaluations. That the general manager of the eye clinic in Lund at that time did not support that 
change program even though he acknowledged that the underlying principle was useful can be seen 
in a letter to the top management published on the Proluma web page (Region Skåne, 2008f) where 
he states that he admittedly would have advocated a merger but not according to those conditions 
established by the top management. He mentions numerous reasons to why, some of which was 
discussed earlier in the section ‘Perceived results of the merger.’ 
 
5.4.3 Allowing the operational staff to contribute or not 
The doctors think that the management should have looked to what the two different clinics were 
doing, asked them what they were good at, what could have been done better and then tried to 
make the best out of it. According to one of the doctors the consequence analysis that later was 
done was forced upon the management by the doctors from below after they had been informed 
about the merger. The analysis showed that the business should be placed in Lund, which was the 
opposite of what the top management had decided. Several of the doctors seem to have understood 
that this was going to be the final decision. But shortly after, the consequence analysis’ authenticity 
was questioned and, according to the doctors and also a middle manager’s understanding, this 
decision was revoked. One doctor says that there is someone with a lot of power who simply has 
walked in and “pointed with the right hand”. In the end several of the doctors from Lund felt that 
they had been subjected to a hostile take-over. A middle manager admits that the process was 
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against the will of the entire clinic. Doctors from both Lund and Malmö feel that they have no view of 
how the process is working and that they have no possibility to contribute or get any kind of 
response to their ideas or considerations.  
 
“They *the top management+ have an opinion without having looked at numbers. They 
have a conception of how some things work and based on that conception they decide 
certain things and when one cautiously points out that ‘your conception is not entirely 
right, because considering the numbers of patients we have, how much room we need 
for examination rooms, then we have another dimension here, we have four times as 
many patients as you had thought and we need a lot more square meters’. And then that 
information goes up and then the reply is: ‘So what?’ That is at least how it feels.” 
(Doctor) 
 
The doctors do not know who is taking the decisions that affect them; the middle managers refer to 
the hospital manager and the region director. According to one doctor it feels like the decisions are 
taken very far up where there is no overview or experience from health care. There were some 
rumours saying that the eye clinic had been subject to a bargain between influential managers. 
Indications of how the final decision was made after the objections from the doctors can be found on 
the Proluma web page (www.skane.se/proluma). In a document one influential manager asks a 
doctor if surgery unconditionally must be placed in Lund if retinal research is placed there. The 
responding doctor replies that research would not “unconditionally” be worsened in the long term if 
surgery was placed in Malmö. However, he mentions several setbacks and problems with doing this. 
He also emphasises that his response only concerns the clinical research and not whether the actual 
clinical operations such as surgery would be worsened by the move (Region Skåne, 2009d). Another 
doctor’s response to a similar question asserts that retinal research has been conducted without 
access to inpatient ward beds or operations (Region Skåne, 2009c). However, the project manager 
draws the conclusion from these reports that it is not proven that neither research nor surgery must 
be placed in Lund or requires inpatient ward beds (Region Skåne, 2009a). After contacts with clinical 
managers, the management found no further unconditional demands for immediate time or spatial 
relation between research, surgery and long-term resources (Region Skåne, 2009e). The final result 
was that, in accordance with the earlier decision, on-call duty, management and inpatient ward beds 
were to be concentrated to Malmö (Region Skåne, 2009b).   
 
The main issue for many of the doctors is that they do not understand why the merger was done in 
such a way. Both doctors and middle management think it would have been easier for the doctors to 
accept the decisions if they had only understood why the changes were done and what the gains 
were going to be. Some of the doctors do not to seem to have a general interest in how the business 
is organised. But there are also those who voiced a lot of general interest in effectiveness and 
organisation and complained both about other doctors not engaging themselves enough in these 
questions as well as management’s disregard of  their ideas and considerations. 
 
“If I was allowed to design the business myself I could increase productivity with 50 % by 
tomorrow, if someone would only listen to me. But no one does.” (Doctor) 
 
5.4.3.a Allowing the operational staff to contribute or not – Discussion  
The alternative strategy to strict top-down management is the bottom-up approach where the 
members of the organisation are allowed to contribute to the change.  Studies have shown that the 
most effective senior managers recognise their limited power to mandate corporate renewal from 
the top. Instead they define their roles as creating a climate for change (Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 
1990). Top-down approaches can obstruct the optimal integration between service providers 
(Kodner & Spreeuwenberg, 2002) as well as obstructing the chain of care development. Chances for 
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successful outcomes are also higher if initiated locally by dedicated professionals (Ahgren, 2007). In 
health care, incremental or ‘hybrid’ change within existing organisational forms appears to be more 
effective than top-down strategies of ‘big-bang’ change (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Weil (2010) argues 
that those who undertake a hospital merger should make an effort to increase the clinical 
engagement in the process by encouraging the clinical leaders and practitioners to become far more 
involved in the merger discussions, their implementation and their evaluation. Donabedian (2003) 
describes the managerial efficiency as the efficient production of goods and services through the 
application of various methods, but “without the participation and consent of clinicians, some of 
these changes would be difficult to introduce” (p. 10). 
 
Experiences from change work within Swedish health care shows that the main part of the change 
work should be done within the units where the actual business is conducted in accordance with the 
bottom-up approach (Ahgren, 2007, 2008; Choi, 2011). In health care, R. Axelsson (1998) argues, it is 
required to gain approval for decisions among all the major actors within healthcare, the politicians, 
administrative management and doctors, as well as involvement and a dialogue between the 
different levels within the organisation. This is required in order to gain a greater understanding and 
cooperation between the different actors (R. Axelsson, 1998). The three groups are dependent on 
each other but there is a lack of trustful relations between them. Much could be won by increasing 
mutual trust which could increase both the feasibility to govern the organisation with authority, at 
the same time as it would decrease the necessity for such authority (Hallin & Siverbo, 2003).  
 
Kotter (1996) asks if change is something one manages or something one leads. To manage change is 
to tell people what to do (a logic of replacement), but to lead change is to show people how to be 
(logic of attraction). Change is seen as something someone with authority does to someone without 
authority and the logic of attraction and its power to pull is overlooked (Kotter, 1996 in Weick & 
Quinn, 1999). By making use of the will to change within the organisation one does not only gain 
further acceptance for the changes and reducing resistance, it also makes them more sustainable 
(Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990). Furthermore, since the changes are done in smaller scale, 
continuously and repeatedly, several different structures can be tested and the most effective 
system might slowly emerge (R. Axelsson, 1998). This could probably help avoid the risks related to 
adopting fads and fashion previously discussed. Most organisations have pockets of people who are 
doing small changes already. The challenge is to make these isolated innovations travel within the 
organisation to reach a wider range (Weick & Quinn, 1999). We identified doctors in our study who 
want to contribute to the economic and organisational structuring of their day to day business but 
they feel like they are not allowed to or that no one listens to them. Several studies have shown that 
the doctors’ interest for these questions have increased due to previous health care reforms (Svenér, 
2010; Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). The question is: if that is true, should they not be allowed to be 
involved in the development of the business they work with every day and have the medically unique 
expertise for? Alarik (1982) describes how merger results usually get worse if individuals with 
important knowledge are not consulted, especially since organisational-specific knowledge usually is 
spread in the organisation and not concentrated to one specific group of people. Hallin & Siverbo 
(2003) continue by asserting that a corner stone in the medical profession is the desire to develop 
the operational core business, something Mintzberg (1993) argues is a characteristic of a profession.  
 
In the SUS merger case the doctors have tried to influence the process. They forced the management 
to initiate an investigation and they contributed a lot to it themselves. As a response to the demands 
for consequence analysis published documents indicate how managers made inquiries that seem to 
be much of that kind that Alarik (1982) describes as inquiries as a means of anchoring and 
legitimizing the decisions that in practice have already been made. Inquiries that serve to further 
establish a pre-determined decision and the decision following the consequence analysis, which 
doctors and middle managers perceived as being established and later revoked, are examples of 
what can be seen as breaches of agreements and failures to restore trust. These are according to 
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Ford, Ford & D’Amelio (2008) ways in which change agents sometimes contribute to the occurrence 
of the very reactions they label as resistance through their own actions or inactions.  
 
The consequence analysis was disregarded and concerns were refuted with statements such as 
“professors do not know anything about organisation”, and the doctors were accused of being 
resistant to change. Mintzberg (1993) described how professionals, such as doctors, have a strong 
professional identity and ownership in professional bureaucracies. Dirks et al. (1996) argue that 
identity and psychological ownership will lead to positive or negative orientations toward change 
which explains why individuals either promote or resist change (Dirks et al., 1996 in Pierce, Kostova, 
& Dirks, 2001). However, by assuming that resistance is necessarily bad, the change agents may miss 
the potential contributions of increasing the likelihood of successful implementation. Instead, they 
should use resistance to help in building momentum for change and eliminating impractical and 
counterproductive elements in the design and conduct of the change process (Ford, Ford & D’Amelio, 
2008).  
 
According to Ford, Ford & D’Amelio (2008) reactance theory proposes that resistance is a sign of 
higher levels of psychological involvement and commitment to the success of the organisation, but is 
often misinterpreted as simple disagreement with a proposed change. Thus simple acceptance to 
changes might indicate lower commitment and involvement. Consequently we argue that it would be 
frightening if the doctors did not react to what they thought was bad for the business and ultimately 
the patients.  
 
5.4.4 Explanations to the problems 
The top management assert that the organising of the top layer of the hierarchy, the management 
functions, was done quickly and successfully. But they do not think that the lack of preparations that 
the middle management and doctors have been complaining about falls under their responsibility. 
Instead this responsibility is ascribed to those further down the hierarchy. We asked top 
management if they were prepared for the negative consequences that occurred and how they 
prepared for them.  
 
”Yes, you could say there was preparedness. I would like to say that it was a little 
different depending on different positions, where they belonged in the organisation. We 
were prepared for it and conscious about this, that it will happen, and then where it 
happened we could not say. It came already in Proluma at certain different areas: ’here 
there are troubles’. But if you have read and followed this somewhat, we have a clinic 
where there has been trouble that is called the eye clinic [...]We have had big and small 
problems so to speak and some have solved it directly. We were prepared for it but the 
clinical staff was perhaps not prepared for it.” (Top manager) 
 
When talking about the speed of a change process and people’s reactions to it one of the top 
managers describes the success of the merger as being dependent on the managers further down in 
the organisation. 
 
”I mean, the analysis about why this is done is already done when it happens, so to 
speak. Then it can become more or less successful depending on how all the managers in 
the organisation can motivate people to help and yeah, well… speedy but not insensitive 
yet again. Clear information is what is actually important and that the process is started 
and that you do not sit and discuss. The silliest thing that exists is really to sit down and 
discuss if this was good. I mean ’Hello! The decision is made!’, and now the result is 
dependent on what everyone does to help make it succeed.” (Top Manager) 
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”I think that among these fifteen clinics it was pretty much everyone except a few who 
did it very well. Though, a few of those who lead it then, the work on clinical level, 
underestimated some ‘undercurrents’. The eye clinic became a little troublesome.” (Top 
Manager) 
 
The problems were mainly heavy losses of competence, mostly at the eye clinic but also at other 
clinics. These are according to the top management due to the rivalry between the clinics and mainly 
attributed to the Lund clinic and the Lund doctors.  
 
“There has been some kind of antagonism between them where one has looked down 
upon the university part in Malmö as well. Lund University is just as big in Malmö as in 
Lund when it comes to the hospital point of view. That aspect was a little frightening I 
think, it also led to, in some areas, a competence loss, mainly within eye surgery.” (Top 
Manager) 
 
5.4.4.a Explanations to the problems – Discussion  
Top management claim both that they knew and had preparedness for what could potentially 
become problems later on at the same time as they say that the business further down were not 
prepared for these problems. This is directly contradictory to the claims of the doctors who say that 
they did inform the top management but were not listened to and that their arguments were 
rejected, as discussed in the previous analysis on non-involvement. It is also implying that it does not 
fall under top management’s responsibility to address these problems and be the ones to solve 
them. Boeker (1992) had found that poorly performing organisations with powerful top management 
are less likely to replace their top managers but are significantly more likely to replace those 
managers reporting to the top manager. He says that the top managers buffer themselves from 
performance responsibility but "compensate" by replacing managers further down in the 
organisation in a process referred to as scapegoating. Several managers have come and left during 
the SUS merger, the eye clinic have seen four managers in the last three years. In our study we have 
not looked for any signs of management dismissals resulting from scapegoating but we can see 
indications of the existence of a buffering process in the quotes above.  
 
The buffering is conducted through the shifting of blame from top management to the business and 
management further down the organisation as well as to the internal rivalry between the clinics. 
Alarik (1982) writes that antagonism likely is a common element in horizontal fusions, especially in 
organisations that used to compete against each other. If the leading actors cannot bridge and 
handle these in a constructive manner they can be worsened and obstruct the realization of 
coordination advantages. According to Ford, Ford & D’Amelio (2008) change agents can safely 
attribute problems to resistance as a way of diverting attention from other factors, including their 
own failures. Thus they might be encouraged to engage in scapegoating and shaking off responsibility 
by blaming difficulties on resistance.  
 
Choi (2011) found that in the Karolinska Hospital merger the primary challenge for management was 
to deal with the vertical differences existing in the competing logics between managerialism and 
professionalism, not the horizontal differences. Considering that doctors in our study from both the 
Malmö and Lund units are critical to how the merger has been managed and how everything has 
turned out it seems likely that the existing problems are more of a vertical character than a 
horizontal rivalry character. Thus the blame-shifting towards those further down in the organisation 
evokes the question: who is supposed to be responsible? If middle management (primarily the 
previous clinical manager) and doctors are neither involved nor listened to, should they still be the 
ones to which the responsibility for the success of the merger is attributed?  
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After both literature studies and own research Wallenberg (1997) found that the importance of 
management acts permeates the entire organisation. Management affects individual and collective 
elements in the working climate, which affects the individual motivation and, in turn, the actual 
outcomes. Hence the management cannot blame negative outcomes entirely on the middle 
managers and practitioners but have to acknowledge that they have a responsibility in the actual 
outcomes as well. In his work ‘Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices’ Peter Drucker (1974) 
studied managers in business and public service and claims that it is management  and the managers 
that will determine our future. The last sentence ending the book says that “He [the manager] must 
accept moral responsibility of making individual strengths productive and achieving” (p. 811). 
According to Elmqvist (2002) it is the leadership’s responsibility to create working conditions that 
maximize the personnel’s motivation and change readiness. In relation to change, Kanter et al. (1992) 
argue that responsibility for the microdynamics of the development of the change, with structure, 
coordination and organisation during the entire life-cycle of the process lies in the hands of the 
change implementors.  In their comprehensive exploration of accountability Bemelmans-Videc, 
Lonsdale & Perrin (2007) discuss the role of accountability in a New Public Management (NPM) 
perspective. They assert that it is a prerequisite for legitimizing the exercise of authority and that 
vertically reciprocal accountability is something desirable. However, accountability down the 
organisation requires the possibility of taking decisions at the level where held accountable, 
therefore they argue for an accountability that supports bottom-up participation. 
 
5.4.5 An approach perceived as unrealistic and contradictory  
From both the middle management and the doctors several interviewees have pointed out that 
there were several aspects of the strategy and basis of the merger that were not realistic. Some of 
the doctors’ perception of how the decision has been made is that the top management simply has 
considered the different clinics as blocks that are easily moved together. A middle manager says that 
the top management had the dream that with two such good clinics, the elite in Sweden, the result 
of the merger should be that the merged clinic becomes even better. But when that does not happen 
it is possible that the size and complexity has been underestimated and that it might have been good 
to ask the employees what they think of it. The effects were, for example, that when moving the 
inpatient care from one hospital to the other, but not having decided where to move when only two 
weeks remained, the ward unit that were going to receive them said that they did not have enough 
room. A middle manager says that the top management did not follow through the solution phase 
but had the idea that “things will sort themselves out”. The middle manager claims that the eye clinic 
is still suffering from these decisions. The following two quotes indicate that the doctors thought the 
ideas behind the merger were not realistic. The doctors came from one of each of the two hospitals 
and answered the question whether the management had any preparations for avoiding negative 
consequences or not. 
 
“No. For example, one argument for placing the retinal surgery in Malmö was the fact 
that before Proluma there were fewer hospital beds in Malmö. This was seen of a sign of 
more efficient care. Now we see that these beds are far too few. Among surgeons there 
has been a wish to open up the ward in Lund.” (Doctor) 
 
“I think they were quite naive. They thought that: ‘We believe the idea was good and 
that what we want to carry out is a good idea and we think it can end up as something 
positive’ and they have simply said that: ‘We do not need to take the blow, instead it is 
those who work with it that suddenly need to reorganize or work in an unorganised 
environment’. In any case, I feel that they have not had a really good…well they were not 
so realistic I believe. They have surely pointed out that there will be a transition phase, 
they had different phases. But I do not think they really understood how bad the results 
could be.” (Doctor) 
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Our interest was not only regarding the use of theories but also the use of experience or inspiration 
from other hospital mergers. According to studies within the M&A field only 30 % of the mergers are 
successful. In fact, one of the studies arriving at this conclusion was conducted on hospital mergers 
(Jordan & Stuart, 2000). There are several other examples of this from other business areas, with 
failures rates ranging from 46% (Kitching, 1974 in Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006) all the way to 77% 
(Marks, 1988 in Choi, 2011), and the healthcare sector is not perceived to be any different (Weil, 
2010).The top management are aware of this but have doubt in how to measure a failure:  
 
It depends on how you define failure. Often you have industry measurements on this. 
(…). And you cannot keep Lund and Malmö separately and the merged hospital parallelly 
and study what happens in the future. You must make assumptions depending on the 
development (...). Will the relative competitive power of highly specialized care and 
healthcare research to develop positively? If not, then of course it could indicate that the 
fusion was not successful. But would it have been successful if you had not done it? What 
it is about is to not be afraid of facing the challenges of the future. (...). Things can be 
managed it a good and a poor way, I am sure that there are several fusions that have 
been managed very poorly. (Top Manager) 
 
Among the doctors some have heard about how many mergers fail, while for others it does not seem 
to be known. However, they compare the current situation to previous mergers in Göteborg and 
Stockholm that are widely known among them, and the Helsingborg-Ängelholm merger was also 
mentioned. When either doctors or middle management brought these up they were referred to as 
failed or partly failed processes, with major problems and reorganisation after the merger. One 
doctor experienced it as if top management thought of the SUS merger as “third time’s the charm” 
and said that it “almost felt a little irresponsible”. The top management says that they have “followed 
the development in the surrounding world” and at least tried to learn from what was done in 
Stockholm and Göteborg, where one of the managers say there were several problems. But all the 
top managers say that it is mostly their own vast experience during their careers that they have used. 
However, middle management and doctors believe that top management has underestimated the 
size and complexity of eye health care:  
 
“For them we are a small unit. There are probably many who image that we are testing 
glasses, which we do not do anymore, the opticians do that. In the 60s we used to do it.” 
(Middle Manager) 
 
The need for maintaining the many inter-personnel networks was also mentioned. Within the clinic 
there are several subspecialties where there are one or very few doctors who are the only ones who 
have this special kind of competence and who have established complex networks both within and 
between other clinics with other specialties, such as child care, child rheumatology and trauma. 
 
On different levels in the organisation there are also different views on how to interpret the fairness 
or unfairness of the merger. When talking about successful or unsuccessful mergers one of the top 
managers explains that it is not a good idea to have a winner and a loser: 
 
“Out of a shareholder perspective, that is where a fusion is never a merger between two 
equal parts but there is always someone who uses it to increase the value of his 
shareholder’s shares. One does not care that much for those who are shareholders in the 
purchased company. There is a winner and a loser in such a situation, and I think that 
would be problematic here” (Top Manager) 
 
However, on the clinical level the doctors see this in the opposite way: 
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“It would be better if they took care of what is good and not only appointed one clinic to 
be the loser clinic and the other to be the winner clinic on all places. I think that is 
predestined to fail. Maybe it works within the manufacturing industry, I do not know, but 
not with doctors.” (Doctor) 
 
When concluding our findings of the managing of the merger, there is a quote that in a good but 
rather subtle way describes the perspective held both by the top management as well as how the 
doctors believe the top managers have been thinking:  
 
“First you do an analysis of what kind of changes you want to do. Then you design how 
you want to do it, that is, what is the solution to accomplish what you want to 
accomplish.” (Top Manager) 
 
5.4.5.a An approach perceived as unrealistic and contradictory – Discussion  
The use of realistic and non-contradictory discourse and arguments ought to be an important factor 
in how the doctors perceive both the success of the merger and management’s trustworthiness. 
Trustful relations between managers and employees are lacking in health care but are desirable for 
the health care’s future development (Elmqvist, 2002; Hallin & Siverbo, 2003) as well as in mergers in 
general (Alarik, 1982). By communicating early and often to everyone involved with a realistic 
assessment of the facts rather than being overly optimistic is one of the success factors identified by 
Camara & Renjen (2004). Simply communicating frequently and enthusiastically is not enough since 
there is a risk that the employees might interpret this wrong and accuse the change agent of 
misrepresenting the change and its outcomes. This can be avoided by being as realistic, truthful and 
accurate as possible when describing the change (Ford, Ford & D’Amelio, 2008).  
 
Dysfunctional outcomes are avoided or at least reduced by realistic communication and previews in 
such a way that it helps employees coping with uncertainty (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991). Sometimes 
managers tend to be overconfident in, and overenthusiastic about, merger outcomes which may 
prohibit a realistic identification of relevant aspects. It can also prohibit a holistic view of the 
organisation which in turn may contribute to failed mergers (Seth, Song & Pettit, 2002). Demands 
perceived as unrealistic by the doctors have been identified in other hospital mergers as well, such as 
in the Sahlgrenska University Hospital merger in Göteborg in 1997 (Olafsson, 2008).  
 
According to Posnett (2002) the optimal scale of an emergency care hospital depends on the 
interaction between the health care needs of a local population and the extent of interrelationships 
between specialties within the hospital. The concern shown by the doctors concerning the 
destruction of networks such as those with child care, child rheumatology and trauma indicate a 
perspective where the design of formal and informal relationships is not seen as realistic. Hallin & 
Siverbo (2003) describe how the networks are dependent on mutual trust and reliance within 
healthcare. To destroy both the formal relationships, e.g. the geographical closeness to the child care 
in Lund, and the informal relationships built on individuals’ accumulated experience and trust for 
each other, might create operational inefficiencies that are both hard to measure, evaluate and 
identify. 
 
A paradox in the eye clinic merger is that despite management’s awareness of the problems with 
appointing a winner and a loser in a merger, this is exactly how the doctor’s perceive it. On the top 
management level it is naturally seen as a merger between two equals. The emphasis of maintaining 
it equal results in the previously discussed exchange of clinics between the hospitals based on 
hospital fairness instead of what is best for the business. The paradoxical result is that on the clinical 
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level it is not seen as a fair merger but rather that the smaller clinic in Malmö absorbs large parts of 
the prestigious highly specialized care conducted in Lund, on unclear grounds.  
 
The key to what doctors describe as an unrealistic approach might be explained by how the top 
management seems to think that a problem should be solved: “First you do an analysis of what kind 
of changes you want to do. Then you design how you want to do it” (Top Manager). This sounds 
rather plausible, especially considering management strategy literature that assert the importance of 
developing a strategic vision early in the strategy-making process followed by setting objectives 
(Thompson, Strickland & Gamble, 2007). 
 
However, vision can also hinder effective change if an emotional appeal is used as the basis for 
engaging in organisational change. This might cause negligence of necessary attention being paid to 
operational details that are needed to make the change work (Palmer, Dunford & Akin, 2009). 
Generated enthusiasm may also cause emotions to lower risk-aversion and the insufficient attention 
being paid to possible negative consequences. This is because the collection of relevant information 
that would reveal the weaknesses of the radical vision could be prevented by enthusiastic emotions 
or a leader’s strong charisma (Beyer, 1999). Possible advantages may be exaggerated, especially if 
the leader has contributed to or influenced their formulation (Ibid.). There is also the risk of senior 
managers’ commitment to a vision making them unwilling to re-evaluate its utility and relevance 
(Palmer, Dunford & Akin, 2009). In sum, by failing to recognize the limits of what can be known about 
the future one is likely to race off in the wrong direction (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). 
 
The pre-established objectives of the placement of the management, on call duty and inpatient ward 
units of already selected clinics that was described above in the ‘Focus on the top of the organisation’ 
section indicates that what was desired preceded what ought to be best for the operational 
effectiveness, evidenced by the failure to consult the affected clinics with their operational-specific 
expertise. Thus, establishing the vision and objectives of “what kind of changes you want to do” prior 
to consulting the medical expertise and establishing what would be best for the operations and the 
patients, might have created obstructions to an effective organisational change.  
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5.5 Efficiency in Day-to-day Operations 
This chapter deals with the different views on effectiveness and efficiency. Hence, it covers the more 
abstract ideas, rather than their direct relation to the merger, which is described in more detail in 
previous sections. The first part of this chapter begins with a general reflection on the contrasting 
views on efficiency displayed by doctors and managers, relating ideas such as production per time 
unit and quality of care. The second part of the chapter evaluates more in detail the doctors’ and 
managers’ perception of various concepts, or aspects, of efficiency required for effective healthcare. 
Examples brought up below are job specialisation, technical support functions, patient processes and 
organisational structures.  
 
5.5.1 Contrasting views on efficiency 
It seems that, as when measuring quality, efficiency in day-to-day operations is not so easily defined. 
One top manager reasoned that, in health care, there are probably as many definitions as there are 
people. In general health care is defined along parameters determined by the doctors and: 
 
“There is a risk and a tendency to have a narrow perspective; you see only yourself and 
the patient” (Top manager).  
 
The same manager admits that some of the measures in place are not optimal. However, lacking 
better alternatives one has to use those that are available. Thus efficiency is defined not from the 
clinical end points, such as how many patients were able to return to an optimal way of life, which is 
difficult to define, but rather in the form of how many successful operations have been conducted 
with few or no complications. Another manager proposes that since the hospital mission is to 
produce clinical health care, research and education, efficiency would simply be the production of 
either of these three per time and resource spent. However, there is also a quality aspect in there, 
working through 20 operations each day would not be efficient if that generated many complications 
or relapses requiring further operations. The quality aspect was also mentioned by a middle 
manager, but from the patient’s point of view that the accessibility to health care must be improved.  
 
“Much energy is spent on making sure that patients do not need to contact health care in 
person. Much time is spent on talking about what can be done instead, on their own, and 
what can be done later, instead of spending resources on those who do come in.” 
(Middle Manager) 
 
The same manager also defined efficiency as external or internal efficiency, that is to do the right 
things, or to do things right. Right things could be to focus on the needed health care while doing 
things right could be, as the example above, about prioritizing funding or patient contacts.  
 
Many doctors seem to favour a definition similar to this, in that it could be seen as production per 
time unit, but that quality has a stronger impact. It should be prioritized to let doctors do their best 
in every case to minimize complications and relapses, instead of focusing, as has been the case, on 
clearing patient queues as quickly as possible and make sure that they serve the patient in the best 
possible way.  Also, in addition to the tripartite production mentioned above, one doctor adds 
administrative tasks as a fourth since a great amount of a doctor’s time today goes to such tasks as 
record-keeping, operation planning, dictation and journal-keeping that previously, to a greater 
extent, was handled by secretaries.  
 
The groups were also asked about how they believed the other group to define efficiency. In general, 
the answer was slightly different than the picture put forward on their own, showing somewhat of a 
misunderstanding between doctors and managers in general. Most managers gave a picture of 
doctors as concerned only with their own time, to be able to “punch out at lunch on a Friday” and 
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make their research committee meetings and conferences and do a little doctoring when called on, 
that they did not see the big picture that care had to be given to a larger amount of patients. One 
exception to this is one top manager who believed that:  
 
“They want to perform their job in an uncomplicated way in the environment they are in, 
that they do not have to find ward places, that they can avoid things that do not create 
value for the patient.” (Top Manager) 
 
Doctors, on the other hand, saw management as number crunchers, concerned only with the volume 
of care that would guarantee further funding and a good ranking, that it is all about getting the 
money’s worth. They prioritize along purely financial incentives, getting part of government bonuses 
such as Kömiljarden and Vårdgarantin. Thus focus is on operations that are really quite simple, such 
as cataracts, with fewer long-term complications than, for example, glaucoma, but that are quickly 
operated and thus generate more funds from the bonuses. The negative effect of this is that other 
diagnoses are less prioritized, even though medically they should have a higher priority, and it also 
puts a volume requirement on doctors.  
 
5.5.1.a Contrasting views on efficiency – Discussion 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter of this paper, there is no one way of defining the concept of 
efficiency or effectiveness. Consensus has it that the concepts are sometimes closely interrelated, 
and sometimes not.  In some cases the one is clearly more relevant than the other, but in other cases 
they may be used generally.  
 
It seems that managers favour a definition where the outcome is measured as production per time 
unit, or resource, spent. This seems closer to that of efficiency (Donabedian, 2003), in that the goal is 
to keep resources constant while increasing or maximising output. Managers also mention the 
quality aspect, but with the simple meaning that the goal should not compromise the quality of care 
given measured in number of complications or relapses. This is in accordance with Elmqvist’s (2002) 
results that while maximising output the quality must at the very least remain level to be efficient. 
  
In contrast, most doctors mention that a measurement could be production per time unit, but more 
important is the overall quality of care. This is closely linked to the concept of effectiveness 
(Donabedian, 2003), in that it demands the maximum improvement in health given the constraints of 
the present situation. The doctors also maintain that a certain volume of output should not be 
demanded of individual doctors, as is often the case because of the way the system is funded. They 
should instead be focusing on achieving the highest possible quality of care, and the volume should 
be demanded of the system in general. That is, the output volume required of the hospital, governed 
by public demand, would likely cause variations in the number of doctors employed, rather than the 
number of procedures conducted by each doctor.  
 
In the case of funding health care, the system is built on a pay-per-performance idea. Health care 
providers are financed depending on the amount of care given, defined through the DRG-points 
described in the chapter above. The completion of certain targets, such as reduction of patient 
queues (Kömiljarden) and supplying care within a certain time frame (Vårdgarantin) ensures further 
funding (Governmental Offices of Sweden, 2011). The result of this seems to be a distinct focus on 
output volume relating to these targets, rather than the quality of care given, thus legitimising the 
definition maintained by management at the hospital.   
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5.5.2 Aspects of effective/efficient work 
Efficient day-to-day work in health care is dependent on many things, below are some of the most 
prominent factors of efficiency mentioned by several of the doctors in our study. We have 
categorized these responses into five themes: Technical support functions, Job specialisation, Inter-
personnel communication, Process and timing and effective organisational structures.  
 
5.5.2.1 Technical Support functions 
The problems with the supporting IT-systems’ complicated and inefficient structure was mentioned 
by several doctors. Apparently, there are different journal- and patient planning systems used by 
doctors, nurses and secretaries, such as Melior and PASiS, resulting in much work duplication and 
time lost, both in adding and editing information and also when retrieving it. Melior, the primary 
physician database for patient journals is standardized for the entire hospital. It has a plain text 
layout which is not suitable for the eye clinic which has a need mostly for data points tracked over 
time to evaluate deteriorating circumstances. This means much data is penned by hand in long lists 
that takes a long time to find afterwards instead of building a program on columns of data displayed 
in a diagram. PASiS is an administrative patient planning system used mainly by nurses and 
secretaries to plan the patient process. When introduced, workload was expected to go down so the 
number of secretaries was reduced. However, the workload drop was far lesser than expected which 
increased the remaining secretaries’ work burden and several of them resigned, says one doctor. 
Also, Lund and Malmo hospitals had different systems and practices which have not yet been 
completely integrated. Problems still occur at SUS due to the differences of the two constituent 
hospitals. A similar notion is held by one middle manager, who mentions that:  
 
“Our so called support instruments from the IT-side give little support to the doctors in 
the patient process; they are designed only to document. Coupled with compound errors 
during dictation, transcribing and journal input this is not effective.” (Middle Manager) 
 
5.5.2.2 Job specialisation 
Almost all doctors mentioned the importance of good support functions in place in their clinic in 
order to get a good work flow, with quick and efficient switching of patients and post-op work. 
Managers also agree that higher efficiency will also be achieved by:  
 
“Removing non-value adding time, such as documentation, searching for information 
and transportation in the patient process. Doctors should not have to run between 
different places and support must be available and effective, such as someone helping 
with documentation.” (Middle Manager) 
 
 
A doctor expressed this clearly in that specialization is seen as the premier tool for efficiency, that 
doctors do only what they are specialised in. One doctor operated 15 patients per day while working 
at another hospital, where there were two specialist nurses assisting. When working at SUS, such 
support is sometimes missing and seeing ten patients a day is considered good productivity. Another 
mentions that while working at a different hospital with readily available secretaries and specialist 
nurses, 18-20 patient consultations were handled each day. At SUS the average was 8-10 per day as 
the doctor had to fetch the patients, have the consultation, dictate and import to journals and 
handle calls individually. A related function here is secretaries, who used to assist with dictation and 
transcribing patient journals, scheduling etc. According to doctors they spend approximately 30% of 
the day with administrative tasks which could be handled by secretaries. This situation causes a 
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stressful environment, since there are directives from above on how many consultations should be 
cleared, in which communication with the patient may suffer and not all information is relayed, 
resulting in renewed visits or calls just to get a little extra information.  
 
In general, both managers and doctors agree that job specialisation would increase efficiency: 
 
“Have the right person in the right place. You shouldn’t do something that another 
person on another schedule with a different salary can and is hired to do. It’s the same 
thing with cleaning the office space as well. Why not hire a cleaner to do it, and I can see 
more patients until I go home.“ (Doctor) 
 
In relation to the recent reduction of secretaries and specialist nurses, one doctor says that: 
 
“You don’t save money on laying off secretaries, only on increased productivity. This is 
what they do at private hospitals, so we know how to do it. Why not do it here as well?” 
(Doctor) 
 
5.5.2.3  Inter-personnel communications 
A second aspect agreed upon by a majority of doctors is that of efficient inter-personnel 
communications. Many diagnoses have a varied spread of symptoms and complications that may 
expand beyond the borders of one specialisation, such as retinal surgery sometimes encountering 
issues relating to the visual cortex, a facet toward neurosurgery. Doctors find it critical to efficiency 
to be able to discuss this with the relevant colleague: 
 
“Currently, we have to send patients by referral to other doctors and clinics, previously 
we could just catch someone walking down the hall, discuss the situation or have 
him/her look at it and solve it directly. Especially relating to the eye there are many small 
things you have to look at, and it is difficult or cumbersome to describe it all in text.” 
(Doctor) 
 
This relates also to the education of doctors during the residency/specialty selection (ST-tjänst). 
When there are residents at both sites they may not be able to take the time to travel more than an 
hour one day to see a case at the other site and in many cases the dialogue between colleagues is 
the best way for seniors to transfer their knowledge to juniors and similarly to medical researchers 
who need access to the clinical cases. In short, accessibility is stressed by doctors. These formations 
of knowledge clusters are also acknowledged by management, in that they can help promote 
innovation and increase efficiency. It is also a strategy to direct these clusters to form where they are 
most needed, as in moving clinics that can benefit from such clusters closer to each other.  
 
Doctors also emphasise the need for a coherent and consistent communication of goals and targets, 
to provide something to work towards. This can be seen in every day work, for example when it 
comes to prioritisation of patients. Lacking such consistent targets could lead to a sense of dejection 
and less engagement with work, resulting in a worsening of work environment and lessened 
constructive communication between colleagues. This could happen due to any type of change, and 
an example related to the current merger is mentioned by one doctor: 
 
“Previously we had meetings every week, and it was a natural thing for everyone to go, 
now people just do not care anymore, they are tired. If someone didn’t go earlier, people 
noticed, now no one pays any attention and there is a general feeling of non-
engagement” (Doctor) 
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This lack of attendance at weekly meetings means less information exchange and communication. 
Also, geographical closeness is stressed as important to get people to attend these meetings. Few 
would consider travelling any excessive distance to attend these meetings, which are in essence 
voluntary. A result of this non-attendance at meetings and generally lessened communication 
between units of the clinic, and doctors working at the different sites, is that it has lead to mistrust 
between the different units. One doctor mentions that when employee morale and working 
environment drops, you start questioning more things.  
 
“You are working at different sites and then you think that *the others+ aren’t doing 
anything, and they think we aren’t doing anything. *…+ You wonder, he has five patients 
and I have 8. But is it really true that he only takes 5 over there? There are many rumours 
like this.” (Doctor) 
 
5.5.2.4 Process and timing 
One of the greatest inefficiencies identified by both doctors and management concerning work 
processes is the preparation time of surgery, leading to downtimes during the day.  
 
“Downtime is for example after you have operated on a patient that patient has to be 
dropped off, you have to clear the room, clean everything and set it up with new sterile 
equipment. It can sometimes take up to an hour to make a switch like that. *…+You never 
know when that hour will come so you can’t plan an extra consultation for that hour 
either. Basically you wait, maybe make a phone call or check up on a previous patient, 
but there is quite a bit of downtime.” (Doctor) 
 
The doctor also comments that abroad they often have more nurses and operating rooms, so the 
doctor simply makes a round operating efficiently all day. One manager specialising in process flows 
corroborates this account, and adds: 
 
“I have been a doctor as well, so I know how it is to sit there thinking: Do I really have to 
stand here waiting because the anaesthesiologist is so slow, can’t I get in there already? 
Or why is the next patient not on time from the ward? And they ask why the doctor is not 
on time for surgery? There are many instances of this” (Top Manager) 
 
However, the problem may be more dependent on the natural flow of patients, and may not be so 
easily affected. One doctor says that often times, efficiency is not solely dependent on the speed of 
operation room set up but rather on the flow of patients:  
 
“When you have an even flow and everyone have an even work pace, not when you sit 
two hours rolling your thumbs, then you work really fast for two hours and then it’s back 
to rolling your thumbs, that’s what I think is efficient. An even flow.” (Doctor) 
 
Added to this is the way scheduling is done on the clinic level. Most of the time, the doctors have big 
influence on when to work and when to use the time for other purposes, such as vacation, research 
and seminars and conferences. According to one top manager, the consultancy firm ATD Little was 
brought in to investigate possible bottlenecks in production, and they directly pointed to the 
scheduling system, including concerns that operating clinics were sometimes closed as early as noon 
on a Friday for no apparent reasons. The manager points out that there should not be less time for 
research, which aids the development of the field and the region, but rather that it should be better 
planned in accordance with production requirements.  
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One manager adds that the availability of ward spaces is sometimes a problem and the system of 
admitting patients for observation to the wards is unrefined:  
 
“In every single case a discussion sometimes starts, that could be repeated several times 
a day, instead of making sure everyone knows exactly who should be placed where in 
every situation” (Middle Manager) 
 
This problem is escalated by the fact that sometimes patients are admitted unnecessarily, as stated 
by one doctor: 
 
“There is a big difference depending on whether you admit someone for post-op 
observation or not. For some surgeries you lose money if you do not admit the patients 
because you do not get as much money for them.” (Doctor) 
 
A further issue mentioned is with the queue system, and the governmental stipend ’Vårdgarantin’ 
which states that all patients referred to specialist care must be attended to within 3 months. In 
contrast, one doctor mentions that: 
 
“The patient sometimes wants to wait longer than the guaranteed 3 months. *…+ they 
don’t want to do it straight away. *…+ Previously we asked the patients if they wanted to 
be placed in the guaranteed queue, some of them said no voluntarily because they didn’t 
think it was an emergency. But the politicians didn’t want that, so now all are placed 
within the guarantee automatically.” (Doctor) 
 
5.5.2.5 Effective/Efficient Organisational Structures 
Finally, some relevant organisational issues are presented here, such as the on-call organisation, the 
relevant level of patient care, spatial arrangements of clinic units, incentives for building efficiency, 
clear financial priorities and, finally, the progression of Lean Healthcare.  
 
While most agree that centralizing on-call and emergency care is good for securing critical volumes in 
certain specialties, several doctors mention clear drawbacks when on-call staff is not specialized in 
eye care. The result from having non-specialist trained staff is that the on-call doctor will be called in 
more often to advise on-site, which means higher costs due to the pay increase during the night. 
Coupled to this is the issue of whether the patients should be handled in the primary care level or the 
secondary, that is, in the local health centre or at the specialist care of the hospital. Many times, the 
primary care centres are overcrowded also with the simple type of procedures they are supposed to 
handle, so things not really requiring specialist care gets sent to the hospital clinic anyway. The 
problem with this is that it costs much more to treat the patients there than at the primary facility 
since the on-call doctors have to be called in again. 
 
Further, the spatial arrangement of the clinic is important as it affects travel time for doctors and 
patients. If the different units of the clinic, such as consultation rooms, operating rooms and patient 
care wards, are spread out this means quite a bit of time gets lost on travel. Currently, one doctor 
mentions an example where it can take more than an hour moving from one location to the next, 
owing to the sterile requirements of the environment, an hour that could be spent on patient 
consultations.  
 
Also, the incentives for improving health care are missing, according to a few of the doctors. There is 
a general salary structure for the public health care with the effect that the only time employees 
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have to negotiate for a higher salary is the commencement of a new employment. There is little or 
no consideration for a premium on performance or competence. The result of this is that some newly 
employed doctors have higher salaries than their seniors who are still involved in training and 
educating them. As stated by one doctor: 
 
“What are the incentives for improvement? What are the incentives to do a better job, to 
cram in those extra few procedures, to build a more efficient organisation? Sometimes 
we used to work really hard until late into the evening, but we didn’t get anything for 
that. The same goes for nurses too, who compared to us, have an even worse salary.” 
(Doctor) 
 
A closely connected issue is that of unclear financial priorities in the organisation. Apart from the 
previously mentioned issue with patient queue priority, a couple of doctors also mention a recent 
development in countering age-related degeneration of the retina, the drug Lucentis. It is vastly 
more effective than previous treatment, and thus has quickly become standard. Unfortunately it is 
also very expensive, averaging about 10 000 SEK per injection, and a minimum of one per month for 
three months are prescribed. The result is that a few resident positions in the clinic have had to be 
removed in order to afford these treatments and since these doctors also treated other types of 
patients, total production has decreased.  
 
One thing that all doctors agreed upon was the need for consistency in communication when it 
comes to future plans, and general goals and mission of the organisation. As exemplified with the 
merger, one doctor believes this lack of communication is directly related to a decrease in employee 
motivation and morale:  
 
“I think the purpose was never clearly defined, you have to decide that this is what we 
are going to do; now there is no clear picture of expected outcomes toward which we 
work. Rather it’s up to oneself and it demands a lot of engagement. Like from the start 
we thought that large parts would move out [from Lund] but that has not happened. 
Now the house in Malmö and the one in Lund are to be demolished so we don’t know 
how it will look, and that makes it difficult to feel engaged in your work.” (Doctor) 
 
A concrete aspect of how to organise is the Lean Healthcare program incorporated prior to the 
merger, in 2007. This was communicated clearly as the way to go forward. One manager even 
mentions that the only reason he agreed to join the organisation was because of their apparent 
engagement with these ideas. A key point of Lean is to build efficient processes designed around the 
service, or in this situation the patient. In contrast, doctors note that the Lean philosophy has not yet 
completely penetrated daily operations:  
 
“This is the opposite of Lean, with patients being sent to different places and they can’t 
do all consultations or operations in the same day because it’s in different locations and 
such. “ (Doctor) 
 
“If you look at patient- and health care efficiency we are supposed to do as much as we 
can at the same time, that’s not how it works now. For example with patients with 
cataracts and glaucoma you examine their field of vision, to the sides, that is rarely done 
with a doctor. Instead the nurses feel it is more efficient for them to have their own 
appointments with patients to do this. But from mine and the patient’s point of view it 
would be good to combine them. *…+ What people are afraid of is patients sitting in the 
waiting room a long time. But if you decide to do it all at once, you can inform the 
patient that maybe they will have to wait for an hour and a half, and if they know that 
they are ready for it and it doesn’t bother them as much.” (Doctor) 
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5.5.2.a Aspects of effective/efficient work – Discussion 
5.5.2.1.a Technical Support Functions 
The demand for stronger support functions from doctors can be understood in several ways. In one 
sense, it is in line with Porter’s Value Chain model (1985) in that the core business, comprising 
logistics operations, marketing & sales and service take precedence in the chain and are supported 
by infrastructure, HR, technology and procurement. In the present case, doctors inhabit a role in 
operations, while the journal- and patient planning systems are part of the technology support. 
Another way of looking at it is with the Lean production system, spawned by Ohno and Shingo 
through the Toyota Production System in Japan, and popularized in the west by Womack et al (1990). 
One of the pillars of Lean is to standardize the workflow and eliminate waste in the process around 
value creating activities, defined as the value desired by the customer (Proudlove, Moxham, Boaden, 
2008). In the present case, it could be argued that the value desired is, for example, a surgical 
operation completed without complications in a timely fashion, where the patients is adequately 
informed of the process and outcomes. IT-systems in Lean are supposed to assist in the value 
creation just as any other function, but are often complicated in build and “fat” (Raman, 1998). They 
often include any possible function, which may compromise overview and usability. The same can be 
seen in this case, where the IT systems are noted for documenting rather than supporting, and much 
time is wasted on adding and retrieving information in a complex system. This is the case even 
though many researchers stress the importance of a well conceived IT support system (Elmqvist, 
2002; McGuffog & Wadsley, 1999).  
 
5.5.2.2.a Job specialization 
Job specialisation is seen as a form of concentrating competence, enhancing development and thus 
improving effectiveness and efficiency. This idea goes back as far as the work of Adam Smith and the 
wealth of nations (1776, in McGuffog & Wadsley, 1999), stating that the division of labour, and thus 
job specialisation, increases productivity and consequently unit cost of production, making it more 
efficient. The reason for this, argues Mintzberg (1993) is that through repetition the employee gains 
experience, rationalises the process and may improve it through new processes or tools. The doctors 
in this study argue that a return to more specialised tasks may improve efficiency through the 
elimination of peripheral duties and administrative tasks that could be handled by nurses, orderlies 
and secretaries instead. Especially in the case of administrative tasks there is a clear economic gain 
because of the salary difference of about 30,000 SEK per month between a secretary and a doctor, or 
about 180 SEK per hour of work. This would increase the potential productivity, and it is argued that 
while some additional nurses, orderlies and secretaries would have to be employed, their lower 
salary has less of an impact on costs than the resulting increased revenues. This is possible because 
of the current national funding system in place, discussed below. Argyris & Schön (1978, in L. 
Axelsson, 2000) argue that highly specialised care deals with complicated problem solving of an 
extreme nature that must be conducted in an autonomous environment, in accordance with 
professional literature discussed in a previous chapter. This is because the field is dependent on 
science and accumulated experience in areas that cannot easily be managed in detail. In contrast, 
one concern voiced by doctors is that management tries to interfere too much in the aim of 
controlling output volume which has a negative impact on patient consultations.   
 
 The general problem with job specialisation is that it requires greater efforts in communication and 
coordination of the organisation. Also, it could lead to lessened employee satisfaction as they see 
their field, and areas to influence, decreasing (Mintzberg, 1993). To offset this, specialisation is 
sometimes followed by job enlargement, where you add new tasks and responsibilities. This seems 
to have been what happened the past few decades, where doctors, nurses and secretaries 
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exchanged tasks and responsibilities and, to some degree in the case of secretaries, reduced 
presence in the organisation. It follows from this that if an increased specialisation were to occur, any 
resulting improvements in employee morale could be temporary and, in the long run, lead to a call 
for job enlargement yet again.  
 
5.5.2.3.a Inter-personnel communication 
The problems relating to communication between employees in the organisation is closely connected 
with the ideas of an organisation built on internal network discussed by Hallin & Siverbo (2003). The 
network is made up of closely connected relations between employees with a self-regulating control 
mechanism through mutual understanding and trust. In this network, employees are depending on 
each other to solve complex problems and fulfil the service to patients. Geographical closeness 
between doctors is one thing that is stressed as a prerequisite for effective communication, and an 
efficient organisation is dependent on good communication (Olafsson, 2008). This is also in line with 
the Lean reasoning, described above, that anything improving value creation should be enforced and 
waste, such as travel time between sites and writing up documentation for referring a patient to 
another site, instead of being close enough to discuss it at once. With a lack of insight into the 
workings at the other sites, some elements of mistrust have also developed. Since trust is central in 
the network organisation, this makes it even more difficult for new networks to be built. 
 
The doctor cited above also mentions that people are tired of constant changes, which has lead to a 
feeling of non-engagement with work and deteriorating communications. This seems to be a sign of 
excessive change, or what many label initiative fatigue (Palmer et al., 2009), which can be defined in 
two forms. The first is where the organisation carries out many changes at once, seemingly 
contradictory or unrelated. The second is where a rapid succession of changes occurs over time, and 
personnel feel that resources are spread thin without effect. In our case, it seems that some of both 
occur. An example of the first form is that many have the feeling that Lean was at first promoted as 
most important, but has later been toned down. The second form can be seen in the statements that 
changes occur constantly, in where units of the clinic should be placed, how many ward spaces are 
available and different targets of the merger evolving over time.  
 
5.5.2.4.a Process and timing 
Issues with process and timing identified relate to inefficiencies in the work processes of the doctors 
and the way schedules are set. The inefficient work processes are largely about downtime between 
operations, but also that there are uncertainties in how, and where, to admit patients for 
observation in patient wards. The inefficient work processes can be related to the Lean production 
system, or Lean Health care, mentioned above. The key is to design the process around the service to 
the patients, and eliminate waste. In this case, the variability in demand causes an uneven flow. 
Raman (2008) argues that instead of organizing functionally, activities should be aligned in a 
continuous flow to minimize sub-optimization. We would like to note that this should be possible 
with elective surgeries, however it is more difficult to attain in emergency cases. Also, as opposed to 
manufacturing industries, demand cannot be manipulated with a reduction of cost/price, as it 
depends more on when patients experience ailments. Hence, a perfect flow of demand will be 
impossible to manage, and a clearer focus on an effective process from when the patient reaches the 
hospital to when treatment is completed should take priority. Another, similar, opportunity to 
analyse this is through the use of business process reengineering (BPR). BPR places focus on 
understanding customer requirements and performance measurements, enabling cross-functional 
teams and communication and process mapping and reconstruction in order to suit the final needs of 
the organisation and customers (Al Mashari & Zairi, 2000). A key distinction between Lean and BPR is 
that BPR places greater focus on the IT systems available and what use they can contribute. The 
ineffective structure of the current IT-system at SUS may be a hindrance when considering BPR, 
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nevertheless the idea of constructing processes around the service, and eliminating waste, remains 
applicable to this study. An example where direct benefits may be realised is the scheduling. At the 
moment, according to managers and external consultants, doctors at SUS have too much say in how 
the scheduling is done. Redesigning this process centralized on production of patient care and 
servicing the needs of the patient, prioritizing research time and conferences lower, could allow a 
more level flow of production and more efficient processes.  
 
5.5.2.5.a Effective/Efficient Organisational Structures 
Finally, some relevant organisational issues are presented here, such as the on-call organisation, the 
relevant level of patient care, spatial arrangements of clinic units, incentives for building efficiency, 
clear financial priorities and, finally, the progression of Lean Healthcare.  
 
The organisation of on-call capabilities was one major point brought up by doctors. The argument is 
that non-specialist trained nurses on night shift means the on-call doctor has to go to the hospital 
more often during the night. This is inconvenient in several ways. First, more frequent attendance at 
the hospital means reduced sleeping time for the doctors. These precious hours are undeniably 
needed since on-call is done outside of regular working shifts, meaning they work during the day as 
well. The night-time nurses do not since they are placed on a simple scheduled night time shift. 
Second, while being on-call at home costs very little, as soon as the doctor is called in, the pay 
increases markedly. Consequently, a doctor may be paid for a full hour’s work, including travel and 
consultation time, several times per night for something that a specialist nurse could have handled 
on the spot. Doctors are aware of this waste, which shows a higher concern for economic factors 
than attributed to them by managers, in accordance with findings by Svenér (2010). 
 
Regarding organisation of the clinic, the spatial separation of units at different sites was mentioned 
as important. Results from having a spread out clinic can clearly be seen in the increased costs from 
travel and timing inefficiencies. This results in less time for patients which in extension could mean 
longer waiting times, a problem well documented by Fölster et.al. (2003).  
 
Further, problems are identified in the incentives structure, both regarding hospital funding and the 
employee rewards system. Doctors feel that their medical expertise is sometimes overlooked when it 
comes to prioritizing patients because the hospital focuses too much on output as a result of the 
national funding system. The two programs are Vårdgarantin and Kömiljarden (Governmental Offices 
of Sweden, 2011), the first stating that all patients referred to specialised care must have access to a 
consultation and treatment plan within 90 days. Kömiljarden states that hospitals who cut their 
patients’ waiting queue to achieve at least 80% success toward Vårdgarantin each month receive a 
share of one billion SEK. Some doctors argue that this forces the hospital to favour such treatments 
that quickly reduce queues in response to the incentives, and other patients may be prioritized 
lower, even though they are medically more in need of rapid treatment. This type of output control 
can be seen as a rational solution to some problems of management (L. Axelsson, 2000). However, 
the problem is that in politically led organisations, such as the public health care, some goals are 
favoured above others that are not to easily measured. Also the premise that goals can be fulfilled 
through centralised managing and decision-making is also questioned. It has also been noted that 
this type of management has had little long term effects on production in Sweden, consisting rather 
of short term increases in productivity that later disappear (L. Axelsson, 2000). Kirchhof (1974 in L. 
Axelsson, 2000) argues that there are three components to output control: formulation of goals, 
involvement of personnel in decision processes, and that the goals should always be possible to 
achieve. This is most effectively done with a decentralised division of labour and high degrees of 
autonomy, with the support of hard and soft data, i.e. both numbers and, for example, employee 
satisfaction (L. Axelsson, 2000). L. Axelsson (2000) also argues that such control also demands good 
knowledge of work processes, how they relate to each other and what is essential for the outcome. 
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In our case, doctors argue that management has very little insight into daily work, which may explain 
the current negative mood and low morale mentioned by many.  
 
Performance related pay was sought by some doctors, as noted above. Incentives for ‘going the extra 
mile’ seem to be missing for some. Leopold & Harris (2009) note that the main idea behind the 
concept is that monetary incentives acts as a motivator to increase performance. They note that 
“unless the financial rewards available are perceived by individuals to be sufficiently attractive and 
worth the effort needed to achieve them” (p.230) they will not encourage improved performance. 
Dowling & Richardson (1997) add that performance related rewards had little effect in a study in the 
British health care if employees perceived objective setting and evaluation to be done 
inappropriately. The doctors in our study maintain that in certain cases, such as the one quoted 
above with working to clear patient queues, should have a benefit attached. An argument brought 
up against this type of system is the difficulty in satisfying many different perceptions of performance 
(Leopold & Harris, 2009). However, we argue that in this case, the definition is quite simply a matter 
of overtime hours, or extra surgical operations conducted, which would allow such a system to be 
put in place.  
 
Also, it is noted above that the vertical communication of changes and goals has been insufficient. It 
has been noted in several studies that the implementation phase of changes is critical, and of central 
importance in implementation is communication of the change (Russ, 2008). Sufficient information 
can reduce resistance, improve willingness to implement change and enforce employee belief in 
management, specifically a failure to inform employees of what changes are necessary and why they 
are has a highly negative impact on the success of the change (Covin & Kilmann, 1990). In our study, 
doctors complain that communication has been lacking and in some cases inconsistent which has led 
to confusion and lack of engagement in work, employee discontent and, finally, resignations. In order 
to sustain successful relations with employees, clearer and more consistent communication is 
required (Palmer et.al., 2009). 
 
Finally, the Lean production, or Lean Healthcare, framework has been described above. This was 
seen as a type of saviour for public healthcare, and much focus was put on it from managers. Both 
doctors and management still feel that this is one thing that could help solve many problems with 
organisation mentioned above. However, doctors have a feeling that Lean has fallen out of focus. 
Further work with streamlining processes to eliminate waste and increase efficiency is required.  
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VI - Conclusion 
Our study focuses on the eye clinic in the context of an initial clinic-merger process between two 
hospitals (in 2008), PROLUMA, and the following merger between the entire hospitals (in 2010) to 
form SUS. Three years after the clinic-merger announcement a third of the doctors had resigned, 
mostly senior well-experienced doctors. Some left directly because of the merger, others indirectly 
and some without immediate relation to it. The merger and following competence loss had, 
according to the doctors, severe negative impact on the structure, competitiveness, efficiency and 
the provision of quality of care to the patients. The top managers explained that the problems mainly 
were caused by horizontal rivalry between the two clinics. The doctors were generally concerned 
with the purpose and manner of carrying out the merger. The different findings will be commented 
on separately below.  
 
6.1 On the findings on how to measure efficiency 
Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1981) argue that organisational efficiency is a value-based judgment about the 
performance of an organisation based on individual values, hierarchical position, type of unit, 
external or internal perspective, point in time, uncertainty in the environment, and numerous other 
factors. This study indicates that views on organisational and operational efficiency are different, or 
at least differently valued and prioritized, among groups on different vertical positions in a hospital. 
 
From this follows that there are differing views on how to measure efficiency and carry out an 
organisational change where the end results are truly efficient. In our study we found different wills 
regarding the emphasis on either measuring economic efficiency or medical effectiveness which 
causes frustration among the doctors when economic incentives override their medical expertise. 
The reason to the priority disparity might be the different actors’ educational and work backgrounds 
that influence how they act (L. Axelsson, Kullén Engström & Edgren, 2000).  
 
6.2 On the findings on the purpose and results of the merger 
All the participating doctors in this study verified that there had been rivalry between the two clinics 
prior to the merger. It seems to have been mainly a result of conflicts between certain individuals. 
Several doctors from both clinics indicated a lack of understanding for why that rivalry existed 
between those individuals and an ignorance of the actual reasons to its existence. Instead they claim 
that the rivalry was severely aggravated by how the clinic-merger was managed. This resulted in an 
“inflamed” and “war-like” process. However, in contradiction to the top management none of the 
doctors claimed that the negative consequences of the merger had much to do with the actual 
rivalry. Instead doctors from both clinics asserted that the problems existed due to the lack of 
understanding of what the actual purpose was and its legitimacy, how the merger was carried out 
and managed, and the inefficient final organizing of the merged clinic where the ward unit, on-call 
duty and existing networks suffered serious deterioration.   
 
The existence of horizontally rivalry should not automatically be seen as the actual cause of a 
merger’s failure since, as according to the Pygmalion effect of self-fulfilling prophecies: you are likely 
to find the kind of resistance you are looking for (Kanter et al., 1992) and you might even contribute 
to it (Ford, Ford & D’Amelio, 2008). Hence our study supports the findings of Choi (2011), studying 
another major Swedish hospital merger, that despite much organisational behaviour literature 
explaining merger failures with horizontally different cultures, the primary challenge for 
management at both hospital and clinical level is to deal with the vertical differences and the 
institutional competition between managerialism and professionalism.  
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The process and results of Proluma and the SUS merger indicate support to concerns voiced 
regarding the decision-makers convictions of hospital size as a determinant of performance, cost-
efficiency and quality of care (Weil, 2010; Ahgren, 2008; Posnett, 2002). Change starts with initial 
failures to adapt (Weick & Quinn, 1999) but a fusion should not be seen as an easy-way out that 
quickly and automatically resolves the organisation’s initially flawed business idea (Alarik, 1982). 
Instead this study proposes that the future direction of health care management should be to focus 
on the real issues within health care organisations and their operational processes. The importance 
of on-going training, personal and organisational networks, appropriate ancillary and support 
services as well as doctor’s administrative work-load should not be overlooked (Weil, 2010; Posnett, 
2002); especially since Swedish doctors are increasingly imposed to do more and more admini-
strative work instead of treating patients (Svenér, 2010; Fölster et al., 2003; Hallin & Siverbo, 2003). 
 
6.3 On the findings of managing the merger 
Regarding how to carry out an organisational change where the end results are truly efficient, the 
top management is favouring a strictly top-down process, a strategy indicated to have several 
limitations (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). Doctors and middle managers favour a bottom-up process 
where those who work close to the core operations are allowed to contribute to the actual design of 
their every-day work (Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990). Considering the perceived results of the 
merger the same pattern exists. The Top Managers are happy with what they have achieved, though 
the focus of their evaluations is based primarily on the top of the organisational layers and not the 
operational core work. Middle managers are much more hesitant or slightly negative to the process 
and its outcomes while the doctors have not seen any improvement at all but an abundance of 
destroyed efficiencies and existing functions where structure has been replaced by chaos.  
 
Hence the results of this study indicates that further attention need to be addressed to the 
involvement, contributions from and the operational and professional expertise of the doctors who 
are the ones actually treating the patient and have well-developed experience from what is efficient 
or not in their daily work. This is in accordance with the findings of (Elmqvist, 2002) who, in a 
comparison of seven other Swedish eye clinics, found that the operational managers had greater 
organisational skills than the top managers which resulted in a risk for tensions and conflicts.  
 
6.4 On the views on efficiency 
In this study the ones closest to the processes and the patient’s have indicated that the efficiency 
problems are related to insufficient IT-systems, an inefficient job specialisation strategy and an 
undeveloped incentive and rewards structure. In accordance with other studies, these are some of 
the most important facets to consider in public healthcare (Elmqvist, 2002; L. Axelsson, 2000; 
Leopold & Harris, 2009). Furthermore, they indicate that a closely arranged network organisation 
aids communication and work environment, similar to that found by Hallin & Siverbo (2003), and that 
change programs should be more structured and well planned.  
 
6.5 Final Comments  
In conclusion, more precise goals on the operational level regarding organisation should be 
determined. These should address different needs within the organisation and thus be based on 
contingency factors for each specialty (Mintzberg, 1993). The burden of proof must be on those who 
propose the organisational changes to quantify the expected benefits and costs and to explain the 
process by which benefits will be realized in practice (Posnett, 2002; Canadian Health Services 
Research Foundation, 2004). In our study the top management proposing the mergers failed to 
provide satisfactory advantages to the employees who could neither understand nor accept the 
expected economic or qualitative improvements. Doctors should be allowed to influence and 
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contribute to the envisaged changes in order to fully exploit their operational and professional 
expertise. When the change actions, such as planning and implementing, are shared by the different 
actors involved in the change it can be carried out smoother and more efficiently, as the distinctions 
between the actors are less marked (Kanter et al., 1992). 
 
To put this in relation to our initial purpose and objectives, we can conclude that: 
 
1) There is little agreement as to how measurements in healthcare in general, and the SUS 
hospital in particular, should be defined. The differences can be summarised as management 
leaning towards financial measurements and volume of care, while doctors would like 
measurements to take into account the quality of care and service to patients.  
2) There are different views on how to manage organisational change between managers and 
doctors. Management prefer a top-down approach where plans are carried out as stipulated 
and the results are dependent on how different employees engage with this process. Doctors 
believe that they should have more say in how the change is carried out, and that change 
should depend on the operational processes, and what is needed from a doctor-patient point 
of view.  
3) From the context of the SUS merger it is clear that management has a narrow view of what 
doctor’s feel is necessary for improving efficiency in their daily work. Doctor’s stress the need 
for customized IT-support, stricter job specialisation, clear patient processes and the 
possibility to form informal networks and knowledge clusters. It appears that many of these 
efficiencies have been impaired as a result of the top-down managed merger. 
 
It seems that our initial impression, that different views on efficiencies may cause problems in 
change processes, still poses a viable correlation between these aspects.  
 
Finally, some call for more research regarding health care organizing and hospital mergers (e.g. Choi, 
2011; Aiken & Sloan, 2002). We would like to add to this request. In his thesis on success factors in 
seven Swedish eye clinics Elmqvist (2002) concludes that there is a need for a new management 
style, professional involvement and a more holistic view on health care management. Our results are 
of the same character but in distinction to, or rather in addition to, calling for a more aggregated 
view we argue for an increased focus on the operational efficiencies instead of risking losing oneself 
up in the holistic clouds of top organisation panacea management, high above operational reality. 
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Appendix I 
Interview format and questions 
Introducerande frågor 
1. Skulle du kort kunna sammanfatta din yrkesmässiga bakgrund (utbildning, karriärsteg)? 
2. Vad är dina dagliga sysslor just nu? 
3. Hur kom du in i processen för sammanslagningen?  
Strategiskt syfte med sammanslagningen 
1. Vad var syftet med sammanslagningen?  
2. Fanns det några fler sekundära orsaker? 
3. Hur väl har ni uppnått målen med sammanslagningen? Vad är resultatet hitintills?  
a. Har sammanslagningen fått negativa konsekvenser?  
b. Var man beredd på att negativa konsekvenser skulle uppstå? Hur förberedde man sig? 
c. Använda man sig av teorier, exempel och inspiration från litteratur och andra 
sjukhussammanslagningar?  Vilka? 
Strategisk effektivitet 
1. Vad finns det för fördelar med att slå ihop specialistkliniker från Malmö och Lund? 
2. Vad finns det för fördelar med att istället ha kvar specialistkliniker både i Malmö och i Lund? 
3. Vid tal om sammanslagningar och effektivitet så nämns ofta synergieffekter/skalfördelar som 
ett önskvärt resultat. Men mer specifikt sett, vad räknade man med att dessa synergieffekter 
skulle bestå av? (T.ex. spara in på personal, lokaler, material etc.) 
Operativ effektivitet – läkarnas dagliga arbete 
1. Vad är effektivitet i en läkares dagliga jobb? 
2. Hur kan denna effektivitet mätas? 
3. Hur kan denna effektivitet förbättras? 
 (Till ledningen): Hur anser du att läkarna ser på effektivitet? 
 (Till läkare): Hur anser du att ledningen ser på effektivitet?  
Bakgrundsfrågor/Funderingar – Inte ordinarie: ställs bara i mån av tid 
1. Hur tänker du dig att resultatet av sammanslagningen kommer vara om 10 år? 
2. Var det hos specialisterna man såg de stora förbättringsmöjligheterna?  
a. Varför valde man en sammanslagning istället för ett strategiskt samarbete mellan två 
fristående sjukhus?  
b. Varför slå ihop hela sjukhusen och inte bara de 8 % som utgör specialister? 
3. Om du var ensamt ansvarig för att ansvara över sjukhusets effektivitet och fick välja mellan 
ett och fem effektivitetsmått. Vilka skulle du välja och hur skulle du prioritera dem? 
4. Vilka, inom kanske andra sjukhus, ofta använda eller ibland diskuterade effektivitetsmått 
tycker du är direkt eller indirekt olämpliga att använda inom hälso- och sjukvård? 
 (Till ledningen): Hur påverkar läkarnas handlingar och beslut den strategiska effektiviteten? 
 (Till läkare): Hur påverkar ledningens handlingar och beslut den operationella effektiviteten? 
Specialfrågor till läkare:  
 Finns det någon oro över att självständigheten som läkare minskar? 
 Finns det någon oro över att det kan ske en förskjutning av makt/inflytande i organisationen? 
 Finns det någon risk för att förlora värdefulla ”professionsegenskaper?” 
 Det hävdas att sammanslagningen leder till att beslut decentraliseras. Kommentarer? 
 Vad anses om schemaläggning och forskningstid. Det börjar ju ändras nu. Kommentarer? 
 När en läkare utses till chef – brukar den personen på något sätt genomgå en förändring? 
